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NOTES

Common Law, Property Rights and the
Environment: A Comparative

Analysis of Historical
Developments in the United
States and England and a Model for the
Future
H. Marlow Green*
Introduction
The quality of the environment has become a concern of international
importance. Although for the most part, legal environmental measures
have taken the form of statutory provisions and governmental regulations,
the common law remains a viable alternative remedy against environmental injury. Common law environmental actions should receive significant
attention in the environmental law debates of our time, particularly as the
European Union considers the form its environmental law will take. An
accurate view of the historical development of common law actions against
environmental harm will enhance any constructive and critical debate
about the merits of common law actions. Such an historical survey also
introduces the issues that arise in the debate over the merits of a common
law, as opposed to statutory, attack against environmental harm. This
Note lays the groundwork for the common law debate. First, it conducts a
comparative historical analysis of the development of nuisance law in the
United States and England; and second, it proposes a normative model for
an international environmental common law. Relying on this model, the
purpose of this Note is to demonstrate that although the development of
* J.D., Cornell University, 1997; B.A., Cornell College, 1994. The author extends
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nuisance law in the United States and England has had a varied and confusing past, the common law may still play a significant role in the modem
environmental arena.
With the exception of the discussion in Part I, which compares and
contrasts the common law and statutory law, this Note treats the subject of
common law remedies for environmental harm as a topic unto itself, without detailed analysis of statutory solutions. This Note explores how common law remedies would need to be structured in order to protect
environmental values effectively in the absence of federal environmental
legislation. The purpose of this approach is to demonstrate that the common law, by itself, has much to offer in the quest to improve the environment. The collection of remedies available at common law provide
compensation for harm caused by pollution and allow the injunction of
polluting activities.1 Moreover, the common law also places the power to
prevent environmentally abusive activities into the hands of those who are
most likely to be injured: local property holders.
Part I of this Note is a brief and preliminary look at the common law
system. Part II contains a comparative historical analysis of the development of common law nuisance and related doctrines in the United States
and in England. Recognizing that the historical development of nuisance
law has left it in a confused state in both countries, Part III proposes a
property rights-oriented model for a common law based system of environmental law.
I. A Glance at the Common Law System
Many find it useful to divide "the law" into two broad categories: public
and private law. "Public" laws are statutory-based rules and constitutional
structures, created by legislative bodies. As such, they are considered an
embodiment of the will of the people.
Private law is most closely associated with the common law. The term
"common law" refers to the old English legal process of discovering and
molding the law on a case-by-case basis. Originally, under natural law doctrine, judges considered themselves to be "discoverers of the law." 2 Natural law theory posits that there are "natural" rules of conduct inherent in
humanity itself, most easily discovered by examining the evolution of customs of dealing. 3 Thus, the common law judge's role was to look to custom in order to discern the law that already existed and then to render
1. While concerns such as clean-up of hazardous waste sites, protection of habitats
for wildlife, and the preservation of wilderness areas are significant, this Note focuses
exclusively upon common law remedies against pollution.
2. See FRIEmcH A. HAYEK, 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RuLES AND ORDER 83
(1973). The entire set of Hayek's discussions contained in Chapter Four, The Changing
Concept of Law, and Chapter Five, Nomos: The Law of Liberty, provides an excellent overview of the ancient common law mentality and a representative example of natural law
theory. Id. at 73-123.
3. Cf. id.
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rulings based upon it.4 Later, the notion evolved that similar cases ought
to be decided alike and thus the concept of stare decisis (literally, "let the
decision stand") was born.
An examination of the common law process reveals at least three
related considerations that support the strength of common law over the
statutory process. First, because the common law system of rule-determination relies upon the personal initiatives of parties to civil suits, the common law process ensures that the rules it formulates are based on careful
and equitable contemplation of all information necessary to the resolution
of a particular dispute.5 Because winning a case depends upon the
strength of a party's arguments, an impartial judge must rely on the parties
to present the strongest arguments for ruling in their favor. If the judge
perceives her role correctly, then her legal pronouncement will most accurately reflect the rule that should, and actually does, govern the situation.
On the other hand, legislatively-based public law may be characterized
as one group of individuals creating rules that govern others. Obviously, if
the first group actually represents the interests of the whole, then such a
system operates effectively. The legislative process, however, rarely seems
to find the equilibrium accomplished by the common law because it represents the interests of certain groups either too strongly or too weakly.
Along these lines, scholars have argued that the evolution of special interest politicking 6 has led to an inefficient system of rent seeking. 7 Thus statutory law, in contrast to common law, is often the product of a more
politicized and less informed rule-making process.
The common law's second strength is its nexus with freedom. 8 Arguments supporting this connection have focused on the natural law underpinnings of the common law, 9 the common law process as more conducive
to developing law that, in market fashion, effectively accommodates the
divergent needs and preferences of individuals in society, 10 and the
4. Id. at 83-84 (quoting Farrz KERN, KINGSHIP AN LAw IN THE MIDDLE AGEs 151
(trans. S.B. Chrimes 1939)), 87.

5. This consideration forms one of Hayek's central arguments in support of the
common law. See generally id. ch. 5.

6. For discussion of special interest groups, see generally Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group
Model, 86 CoLum. L. R v. 223 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American
Public Law, 38 STAN. L. Rev. 29 (1985).
7. For an introduction to rent seeking issues and public choice analysis, see generally JAMES D. GwARTm-Y & RIcHR L. STRouP, ECONOMICS: PUvAxrE AND PUBLIC CHOICE
99-111, 579 (7th ed. 1995). See also Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL StUD. 101 (1987). Gwartney and

Stroup define the term "rent seeking" as "actions [by individuals and public interest
groups] designated to change public policy-tax structure, composition of spending, or

regulation-in a manner that will redistribute income toward themselves." GwamEvY &
SRoUP, supra, at 105.
8. This argument is particularly important to classical liberals. See HAYEK, supra

note 2, at 84-85, 94; BRUNO LEoNi, FREEDOM AND THE LAw 95-111 (1991).
9. See HAYEK, supra note 2, at 84.
10. For an extended argument that equates the common law process with the market
system, see HAYEK, supra note 2, ch. 5.
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unchecked power of bureaucratic officials that legislation inevitably creates." Indeed, a significant portion of the discussion in support of the
common law may be reduced to efforts to protect individual liberty.
The common law's third strength relates to its ability to accommodate
private property and free market ideals. As the following sections will
demonstrate, the common law not only evolved out of and around a deep
and abiding reverence for the value of private property and the right of a
property holder to remain undisturbed in his quiet possession, but the
common law also possesses important tools that enable it to delineate and
enforce specific property rights, which in turn allow markets for the trading of such rights to operate smoothly. In the context of disputes arising
from polluting activities, the strength of the common law lies in its ability
to build a foundation for market transactions between polluter and pollutee by providing clear-cut rules of property and liability.12
The common law has much to offer in the search for an effective system to address environmental harm. It possesses a rich history reflecting
the wisdom of centuries of human experience. Because of its rule-determination process, its connection with the ideals of liberty and its amenability
to property rights-based solutions to environmental problems, the common law is in a unique position to address environmental harms in ways
that the all-encompassing statutory regime leaves untouched.
II. The Development of Common Law Nuisance in the United States
and England: A Comparative Analysis
This Part presents a comparative historical analysis of the developments in
American and English nuisance law. It begins with a discussion of nuisance law's early English roots, demonstrating its foundation in strict liability. The analysis then proceeds to examine the radical shift in American
nuisance law during the ante-bellum period from strict liability to a more
weakened doctrine based in negligence liability. The next section explores
developments occurring in the 1960s when American nuisance law
returned to traditional strict liability principles, thereby creating common
law doctrines fit to tackle the issues of the dawning environmental era.
Drawing upon common law developments in New York, Pennsylvania, and
Oregon, this analysis reveals a general "strong-weak-strong" pattern in the
American evolution of nuisance law. This pattern is compared to the English development of nuisance law over a similar time period. While English
courts flirted with a weakened version of nuisance in the mid-nineteenth
century, English nuisance law-unlike American nuisance law-remained in
its strong form until the 1960s.
11. See LEONI, supra note 8.

12. R.H. Coase provides the foundation for this argument in his seminal article The

Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960); see also infra Part III for discussion of the

article.
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A. Historical Notes on Nuisance, Trespass, and Related Actions
1. Trespass, Case, and Strict Liability
In Middle English common law, civil liability was based upon the powerful
writ of trespass. Trespass was a form of action brought for direct and
immediate physical contact with person or property. 13 However, trespass
provided no remedy for a plaintiff bringing an action for indirect injury
occurring as a consequence of the defendant's activity.
A commonly used example of the distinction between direct and indirect injury proceeds as follows. 1 4 Arthur is prancing along a rooftop carry-

ing a log when he unintentionally drops the log on the walkway below. At
that moment, Galahad happens to be walking on the sidewalk The log hits
Galahad on the head, causing him severe injury. Immediately thereafter,
Lancelot comes waltzing down the walkway, trips over the log and falls on
his head such that he sustains harm identical to that incurred by Galahad.
Galahad may recover against Arthur under trespass. It does not matter that
Arthur's action was unintentional; no inquiry is made into fault. Lancelot,
on the other hand, has no cause of action in trespass. Because the physical
action initiated by Arthur has come to a rest, Lancelot's injury is merely
consequential.
Because of the injustice of differing results as in the cases of Galahad
and Lancelot, a new writ of recovery was created for "trespass in a similar
case." 15 Developed during the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries, the
writ became known as "trespass on the case" or "case." 16 The action lay
for injury caused as a consequence of another's actions.
Although the distinction between trespass and case may seem clear in
the preceding example, the difference can actually be quite subtle. 1 7 Suppose for example, Galahad, suffering a direct injury, decided to bring an
action in case, stating that Arthur was carrying a log on a rooftop, while
doing so dropped it, and as a consequence of that action the log fell onto
Galahad's head causing him severe injury. Could Galahad recover in case?
In Day v. Edwards,18 the Court of King's Bench considered a similar
semantic argument, but maintained that the distinction between trespass
and case was "perfectly clear" 19 and refused recovery "on the case" for an
injury resulting from a direct act. Day is even more intriguing because the
plaintiff injected negligence into the complaint. 20 The dispute arose from a
13. See Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability,37 VA. L. REv.
359, 359-65 (1951); Robert L. Rabin, The HistoricalDevelopment of the Fault Principle: A
Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REv. 925 (1981); E.F. Roberts, Negligence: Blackstone to Shaw
to ? An Intellectual Escapade in a Tory Vein, 50 CoRm.L L. REv. 191, 191-201 (1965).
14. For a full rendition of this example, see Gregory, supra note 13, at 362-63.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Scott v. Shepherd, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (C.P. 1773) (holding that an action
in trespass would lie where defendant threw a lit firecracker into a crowded market and
injured plaintiff, even though several persons redirected the course of the firecracker).
18. 101 Eng. Rep. 361 (KB. 1794).
19. Id. at 362.
20. Id. at 361.
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classic vehicular accident; the plaintiff and defendant were driving horses
and carriages on the same road in opposite directions, when a collision
occurred. 2 1 The plaintiff did not allege that the defendant intended to
cause the crash. 22 Although it is not entirely clear why the plaintiff chose
case, it appears that he believed the element of negligence altered the trespass equation. As a result, the plaintiff alleged that as a consequence of the
defendant's negligent driving, he had sustained injury. 23 However, the
Court would not allow the issue of fault to be injected into the inquiry and
stubbornly insisted that the distinction between24immediate and consequential injury was the only issue to be resolved.
Nine years after Day, the same Court of King's Bench was offered
another invitation to infuse fault into the trespass and case inquiry. The
case of Leame v. Bray2 5 also involved a vehicular collision. This time, however, the plaintiff had brought an action in trespass and it was the defendant who proposed that because the defendant was merely negligent, the
fault
proper action should have been case.2 6 Again, the Court held that 27
was of no consequence to the distinction between trespass and case.
These suits demonstrate that, with respect to civil liability prior to
circa 1800, fault was simply not an essential inquiry to the common law
courts. The issue of cardinal importance was whether the facts alleged in
the plaintiffs complaint, if true, conformed to the form of action that was
brought. If so, the plaintiff had a remedy. If not, the plaintiffs request for
relief was refused. Because these questions formed the legal landscape of
the old common law era, it is difficult to make broad statements concerning strict liability in the context of common law forms of action. When the
issue of fault was present, it was treated as merely incidental. Beciuse
fault, for the most part, was not the central issue, any analysis of the concept of strict liability must proceed on a "per action" basis by exploring the
strength of the legal maxim or rule in its statement and application. 2 8
2.

Sic Utere Tuo-The Nuisance Rule

In the twelfth century, Glanvill included the writ of the Assize of Novel

Disseisin in his compilation of English laws. 2 9 One form of this early writ
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 362.
25. 102 Eng. Rep. 724 (KB. 1803).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 726.
28. There has been an ongoing debate concerning the strictness of common law
liability prior to circa 1800. Horwitz contends that old common law liability was strict.
See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMEmIcAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 90 &
n.156 (1977). Other commentators, however, drawing upon the existence of the defense
of inevitable accident, have taken issue with this assertion. See Rabin, supra note 13, at
927; Roberts, supra note 13, at 203; Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in
Nineteenth-CenturyAmerica: A Reinterpretation,90 YALE LJ. 1717, 1722 (1981).
29. R.GLANvIL, THE TREATISE ON THE LAws AND CUSrOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND
bk. XIII, chs. 34-36 & n.1 (G.D.G. Hall trans., 1965).
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protected a plaintiff from interference with his easements or natural rights
in land.30 This form eventually acquired its own name-the Assize of Nuisance.3 1 Because of its procedural limitations, the Assize of Nuisance was
discarded in favor of a case action that lay for indirect and consequential
interference or injury to the use and enjoyment of land. 3 2 Under this

of equity entered
action, a plaintiff could sue for damages. 33 Later, courts
34
the picture and provided an injunctive remedy as well.
In William Aldred's Case (1611), the plaintiff brought an action on the
case in response to the defendant's offending hog sty. 3 5 The defendant

explicitly invited the court to consider the social value of his operations as
a defense to the nuisance action, stating that because his activities were
"necessary for the sustenance of man.., one ought not to have so delicate
a nose."3 6 But the court rejected the argument and instead articulated the
use his own
doctrine of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas3 7 ("one should 38
property in such a manner as not to injure that of another.")
The sic utere tuo rule dominated seventeenth century property jurisprudence3 9 and was alive and well at the time of Blackstone in the late
Blackeighteenth century. In discussing nuisance in his commentaries,
' 4°
stone stated, "the rule is, 'sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas. "
In its articulation, the sic utere tuo rule is an absolute liability concept.
Its formulation suggests that regardless of the legitimacy or social value of
an offending activity, simply causing injury to someone's enjoyment of
property creates a cause for recovery. Furthermore, Aldred's Case makes
clear that the sic utere tuo rule was not only strict in its formulation, but
was also strict in its application, i.e. the court would not allow questions of
reasonableness or of the utility of the defendant's activities into its nuisance inquiry. The result of this strict application of the sic utere tuo rule
was that "on the eve of the American Revolution, the rule of sic utere tuo
provided absolute protection
against interference with the essential attrib41
utes of land ownership."
30. See Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past, Present, and
Future, 54 ALB. L. R v. 189, 193 (1990) (containing an excellent discussion of the English origins of common law nuisance).

31. The term "nuisance" comes from the French language. The term is derived from
Latin's "nocumentum," meaning loss, damage or detriment. Id. at 192.
32. See id. at 194.

33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id.
77 Eng. Rep. 816 (1611).
Id. at 817.

37. Id. at 821.
38. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1380 (6th ed. 1990).
39. See Lewin, supra note 30, at 196.
40. 3 WijtAm BLActSToNE, COMMNrARIES

*217.

41. Lewin, supra note 30, at 196. For further support of the proposition that the sic
utere tuo rule was an absolute liability concept, see HoRwrrz, supranote 28, at 32; Louise
A. Halper, Nuisance, Courts and Markets in the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1915, 54
ALB. L. REv. 301, 307-08 (1990); Kurtz, Nineteenth Century Anti-EntrepreneurialInjunctions-Avoiding the Chancellor, 17 WM. & MARY L. Rev. 621, 622-23 (1976).

Cornell InternationalLaw Journal

Vol. 30

3.

Other Pre-1800Absolute Liability Concepts: Trespass and Riparian
Rights
As demonstrated above, trespass was, essentially, an absolute liability concept. Despite the existence of the "inevitable accident" 4 2 defense, which
allowed the defendant to plead that the plaintiff's injury resulted from an
unavoidable mishap, the very nature of traditional trespass was the notion
that proof of direct physical contact or intrusion, regardless of fault, established liability. 4 3
With respect to water rights, common law doctrines governing riparian water users have also traditionally imposed absolute liability. The preeminent maxim in riparian rights cases was aqua currit,et debet curerer, ut
solebat esjuie naturae("water runs, and it should run, as it is used to run
naturally"). 44 This "natural flow" theory, the traditional English rule, 45
held that persons who owned real property that adjoined a body of water
were entitled to its uninterrupted flow. Under this doctrine, anyone diverting the natural flow or reducing the water quality was automatically held
liable for violating the rights of riparians; no consideration of the social
value of the violating action was entertained. 4 6 Furthermore, as with trespass, one invoking her riparian rights need not to prove harm; damage was
presumed once interference with a riparian right was established. 4 7
B. The American Weakening of the Nuisance Action
1. The New York Example-Priorto 1900
It is clear from the 1848 case, Hay v. Cohoes Co.,4 8 that New York initially
adopted the English sic utere tuo rule in all its strictness. The defendants in
Hay were engaged in blasting to build a canal. 49 These activities caused
rocks to be tossed onto the plaintiffs land, depriving him of safe use of his
property.5 0 The Court of Appeals noted that the defendant's activities were
a lawful and nonnegligent use of property. 5 ' Nevertheless, it held that "[a]
man may prosecute such business as he chooses upon his premises, but he
cannot erect a nuisance to the annoyance of the adjoining proprietor, even
for the purpose of a lawful trade."5 2 The Court refused to entertain any
defenses to the plaintiff's rightful recovery. 53 If the plaintiff's "absolute
42. See Roberts, supra note 13, at 203.
43. See Gregory, supra note 13, at 362 ("trespass implied all the fault that was noces-

sary for liability").
44. See Bellinger v. New York Central R.R., 23 N.Y. 42 (1861); see also D.H. Cole,
Liability Rulesfor Surface Water Drainage: A Simple Economic Analysis, 12 GEO. MASON L.

REv. 35, 40 (1989).
45. CHARLS
INSTITUTION

DONAHUE, JR., PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE

257 (3d ed. 1993).

46. See E

zAmi BRUBAKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE DEFENCE OF NATURE

47. Id. at 57.
48. 2 N.Y. 159, 161 (1849), aff'g 3 Barb. 42 (N.Y. App. Div. 1848).

49. 2 N.Y. at 160.
50. Id.

51. Id. at 163.
52. Id. at 161 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
53. Id.

58 (1995).
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right"54 was harmed by the defendant's use, the offending use needed to be
barred regardless of the detrimental effects upon industrial development. 55
Thus, the Hay doctrine afforded absolute protection to the rights of private
property holders against harmful interferences with their quiet enjoyment
of land.
The strong stand initially taken by the New York Court of Appeals,
however, immediately buckled under the developmental pressures of
industry. Indeed, the question became not whether the absolute rights of
property holders were harmed, but whether property holders should
6
receive any compensation for the destruction of those rights.5
In Radcliff's Executors v. Mayor of Brooklyn5 7 the Court of Appeals created the doctrine of legislative authorization. 5 8 Under this doctrine, developers acting under state authorization were immunized from civil nuisance
liability if they conducted their developmental activities in a nonnegligent
manner.5 9 According to the Radcliff court, "an act done under lawful
authority, if done in a proper manner, can never subject the party to an

action, whatever consequences may follow." 60 In effect, the doctrine of leg-

islative authorization authorized developers to create a nuisance so long as
their conduct was reasonable.
In response to the strict sic utere tuo rule, the Radcliff court stated that
"a city could not be built under such a doctrine," adding as an afterthought, that the rule "may have been a wise one in [its] day; but it is not
well adapted to our times." 6 1 With respect to the compensation issue, the
court held that although the state constitution's takings provision might
seem to apply, it was "not aware that this, or any similar provision in the
constitutions of other states, has ever been applicable to a case like this."62
The doctrine of legislative authorization was New York's first step
away from the absolute liability concept of nuisance toward the reasonableness standard of negligence. Radcliff represents the extension of negligence standards to developmental and industrial activities authorized by
the legislature.6 3 The doctrine's real impact was to hold legislatively
authorized operations to the lesser reasonableness standard for their harmcausing activities.
After the Radcliff rule was extended to include the operation of rail54. Id. at 162.
55. See Halper, supra note 41, at 308.
56. Id. at 310.

57. 4 N.Y. 195 (1850) (plaintiffs brought suit against the city of Brooklyn in case
alleging property damage from the city's efforts to build a road).

58. Some have referred to this doctrine as the defense of "statutory justification."
See Kurtz, supra note 41, at 649-50; Lewin, supra note 30, at 197.
59. See Kurtz, supra note 41, at 650-51; Lewin, supra note 30, at 197; 4 N.Y. at 200.
60. 4 N.Y. at 200.
61. Id. at 203.

62. Id. at 198.
63. See Halper, supra note 41, at 310.
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roads, 64 the Court of Appeals was only a short step from altogether discarding absolute liability from nuisance actions. In 1873, it took that step
in Losee v. Buchanan.65 An exploding boiler on the defendant's land had
caused harm to Losee's property. 66 Speaking for the court, Judge Earl
stated the sic utere tuo rule was "much modified by the exigencies of the
social state. We must have factories, machinery, dams, canals and railroads." 67 Therefore, no justification remained for a strict application of
traditional nuisance doctrine. According to the Losee Court, the measure of
nuisance was no longer to be whether harm was caused as a consequence
of the defendant's activities, but rather whether the defendant had exercised due care in conducting its activities. 68 "The maxim of sic utere tuo,
etc., only requires, in such a6 9case [as the one before the court] the exercise
of adequate skill and care."

The Losee court addressed the issue of compensation by expounding
the theory that private property holders receive compensation for the
harms they suffer in the form of being privileged to live in an organized
society. 70 In Hobbesian fashion, the Losee court stated that "by becoming
a member of civilized society, I am compelled to give up many of my natural rights, but I receive more than a compensation from the surrender by
every other man of the same rights, and the security, advantage and protection which the laws give me." 71 Under this view, suffering the harms of
nuisances created by industrial activities was merely part of the social
contract.
Losee's negligence standard obviously favored active land uses typical
of the industrial revolution over the interests of small residential property
holders. 72 The opinion stressed the relative strength of interests in developmental uses of land. 73 In Campbell v. Seaman,7 4 however, the Court of
Appeals made it clear that smallholders would not inevitably lose to industrial uses when it upheld a judgment for damages and injunctive relief in
75
an action brought by a smallholder against an offending brick factory.
64. See People v. Kerr, 27 N.Y. 188 (1963); Bellinger v. New York Cent. RR, 23 N.Y.
42 (1861). In Bellinger, the Court of Appeals also extended the defense of statutory
justification to riparian actions. 23 N.Y. at 47.
65. 51 N.Y. 476 (1873).
66. Id. at 479.
67. Id. at 484.
68. Id. at 488.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 484.
71. Id.
72. See Halper, supra note 41, at 320.
73. 51 N.Y. at 484.
74. 63 N.Y. 568 (1876).
75. Halper, supra note 41, at 320. Harper views the Campbell decision as another in
a line of post-Hay cases that led the Court of Appeals toward a more contextual and
factual-based nuisance inquiry. Id. at 321. While Hay represents a simple analysis of
whether harm was caused, Halper argues that the final result of the New York nuisance
doctrine was a multi-faceted inquiry that, in the case of Campbell, took account of location and circumstantial considerations. Id. According to Halper, id. at 334-35, evidence
that the distance from Hay's "single-cell" inquiry to the "modem" contextual inquiry had
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Booth v. Rome, Watertown & Ogdensburg Terminal Railroad76 sits in
stark contrast to Hay and illustrates how far from strict liability principles
the Court of Appeals had marched by the turn of the twentieth century.
Like Hay, Booth was a blasting case in which the plaintiffs house was damaged by the defendant's activities. 77 Unlike other jurisdictions that held
blasting activities to the highest standards of care, the New York Court of
78
Appeals held that blasting, in and of itself, does not create liability.
"Mere proof that the house was damaged by blasting [does not] alone sustain the action."7 9 Reasonable care, even in the case of the inherently dangerous activity of blasting, was the standard for measuring liability. 80
Furthermore, the Booth court added even more context to the reasonableness inquiry. It explicitly incorporated a utilitarian consideration of public
policy. 8 1 In short, reasonableness of land use became a matter of public
policy.
In sum, the New York Court of Appeal's development of its nuisance
law during the ante and post-belium period travelled along a more or less
clearly defined path from strict liability to reasonableness and interest balancing. The effect was that smallholding plaintiffs were forced to bear the
accidental costs of industrial development. By the turn of this century,
New York nuisance law had undergone a radical transformation from
staunchly advocating the rights of smallholders (and consequently being a
powerful remedy against environmental harm) to a weakened doctrine that
left courts free to pick and choose which interests they would protect:
smallholders or industrial developers.
2.

Nuisance Developments Beyond New York: Pennsylvania and the
Restatement of Torts

Between 1875 and 1935 similar developments in nuisance law were occurring in jurisdictions other than New York Not long after Losee, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania began consideration of a case that would
come before it four times before the court would render its final
been earlier traversed. See Booth v. Rome, Watertown & Ogdensburg Terminal R.R1,140
N.Y. 267 (1893), overruled by Spano v. Perini Corp., 250 N.E.2d 31 (1969). For discussion of Booth, see infra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
76. 140 N.Y. 267 (1893).

77. Id. at 271-72.
78. Id. at 273.
79. Id. But see Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R-H.L. 330 (1868).
80. 140 N.Y. at 277.
>The test of the permissible use of one's own land is not whether the use or act
causes injury to his neighbor's property, or that the injury was the natural consequence, or that the act is in the nature of a nuisance, but the inquiry is, was
the act or use a reasonable exercise of the dominion which the owner of property has by virtue of his ownership over his property? [sic] having regard to all
interests affected, his own and those of his neighbors, and having in view, also,
public policy.
Id.
81. Id. ("Public policy is sustained by the building up of towns and cities . ..
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disposition. 8 2
The dispute in Sanderson v. Pennsylvania Coal Co. 83 centered around a
defendant railroad's pollution of a stream. In the 1878 version of the case
(Sanderson I), the court refused to allow a public interest argument, similar
to those accepted in Losee and Booth, to justify an invasion of Sanderson's
property rights. 8 4 But by 1886, the court had undergone a dramatic jurisprudential shift. In the final installment of the case, Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Sanderson (Sanderson IV), the court adopted a negligence standard for
nuisance and incorporated into its inquiry a consideration of the social
85
utility of defendant's activities.
Sanderson IV is noteworthy for its adoption of the "natural use" doctrine, which posits that the defendant is not liable to the plaintiff in a nuisance case so long as the defendant's use of her land is an ordinary or
natural one.8 6 But as the following passage makes dear, this doctrine is
just another formulation of negligence:
It may be stated as a general proposition, that every man has the right to the
natural use and enjoyment of his own property and if, while lawfully in such
use and enjoyment, without negligence or malice on his part, an unavoidable
87
loss occurs to his neighbor, it is damnumn absque injuria.
But even more remarkable than its rejection of strict nuisance liability is
the Sanderson IV court's explicit injection of social value considerations
into the nuisance equation:
We are of the opinion that mere private personal inconveniences, arising in
this way and under such circumstances, must yield to the necessities of a
great public industry,which, although in the hands of a private corporation,
subserves a greatpublic interest. To encourage the development of the great
natural resources of a country trifling inconveniences to particular persons
must sometimes give way to the necessities of a great community.88
In this short and tidy fashion the court reduced property interests, once
deemed so sacred they received absolute protection, to "trifling
82. Sanderson v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 86 Pa. 401 (1878) (plaintiff's appeal taken,
nonsuit reversed and remanded for a new trial) [hereinafter Sanderson I]; Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 94 Pa. 302 (1880) (defendant's appeal taken and judgment

affirmed); Sanderson v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 102 Pa. 370 (1883) (plaintiff's appeal
taken, judgment reversed and remanded for a new trial); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126 (1886) (defendant's appeal taken and judgment reversed) [hereinafter Sanderson IV]. Scholars have referred to these cases as Sandersons I, II, III, and IV
respectively. See also Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in American
Nuisance Law: 1850 to 1920, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 1101, 1163-65 (1986).
83. Sanderson 1, 86 Pa. 401. See also Bone, supra note 82, at 1163.
84. Sanderson I, 86 Pa. at 405-06.
85. Sanderson IV, 113 Pa. at 146.
86. Id.
87. Id. The phrase damnum absque injuria literally means "harm without injury,"
but is used to mean "harm without legal remedy." Further, this passage demonstrates
the shift in emphasis from the plaintiff's property rights to the defendant's rights to
conduct activities on his land.
88. Id. at 149.
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inconveniences."
This process of balancing not only the interests of the parties to a
nuisance suit but also the interests of society at large had its most pronounced voice in the Restatement of Torts.90 Under the first Restatement,
a nuisance was defined as "a non-trespassory invasion of another's interest
in the private use and enjoyment of land" 91 that is either "(i) intentional
and unreasonable; or (ii) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the
rules governing liability for negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous conduct."9 2 The Restatement expressly incorporated a test for balancing utilities into the question of the invasion's reasonableness. "An intentional
invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable under the rule [previously stated], unless the utility of the actor's conduct outweighs the gravity of the harm."93 Factors to be considered in
gauging the gravity of harm were the "extent" and "character" of the harm,
"the social value which the law attaches to the type of use or enjoyment
invaded," locality considerations, and "the burden on the person harmed
of avoiding the harm."9 4 Factors to be considered in gauging the utility of
95
conduct paralleled those to be considered in weighing the gravity of harm.
One scholar has opined that the balancing test employed under the
first Restatement "represented a radical departure from existing precedent."96 According to Lewin, the significance of the first Restatement's balance of utilities test lay in its quantitative nature. Prior to the Restatement,
the nuisance inquiry was more akin to a balancing of interests test where
the "factors were considered qualitatively in a normative evaluation of reasonableness within a natural rights framework." 9 7 In contrast, the Restatement's test was a strict quantitative test that pitted the utility of the
plaintiffs enjoyment against the utility of the defendant's activities together
89. Id. In Pennsylvania RailroadCo. v. Marchant,a case with facts similar to those in
Sanderson, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated, "There are some inconveniences,

which, as was decided in [Sanderson], must be endured by individuals for the general
good. Otherwise we would have an Utopia, where the whistle of the locomotive, the hum

of the spindle, and the ring of the hammer are never heard." 13 A. 690, 698 (1888).
90. RrSTATEMENT OF ToRTs (1934-1939). The Restatements of Law represent
attempts by the American Law Institute to survey the statements of the common law
rules laid down across American jurisdictions and to collect them into one coherent
body. The effort has been viewed by legal scholars as an exemplary expression of legal

positivism. See Lewin, supra note 30, at 210. Although the premise of the Restatements
of Law (as the tide suggests) is merely to restate the law as it actually exists in the
various jurisdictions, informed by positivist legal theories, the Restatement often reveals
itself to be a normative undertaking. The original Restatement of Torts was later superseded by the REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS (1977). A third revision is presently
underway in which the products liability provisions offer dramatic changes to previously existing provisions. See RESTATEmENT (THIRD) OF ToRTs: PRODUCTS LIABuiY,(Pro-

posed Final Draft 1996).
91. RESTATEmENT oF TORTS § 822 (1934-1939).

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. § 822(d).
Id. § 826.
Id. § 827.
See id. § 828.
Lewin, supra note 30, at 211.

97. Id.
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with calculations of social utility. Lewin concludes that although the influential torts scholar William Prosser described the reality of American nuisance law as conforming to the Restatement, 98 in fact, only a handful of
jurisdictions adopted the Restatement's balancing of utilities test.9 9 The
rest continued to adhere to a "qualitative reasonableness test in which the
utility of the actor's conduct was simply one of the many factors in the
analysis of surrounding facts and circumstances" 10 0
Lewin's evaluation suggests that by the turn of this century and
beyond, nuisance doctrine was being stretched and pulled in a number of
directions. A vast number of jurisdictions had shed strict liability in favor
of negligence standards and balancing tests. 1 1 In addition, Prosser and
the American Law Institute were calling for an even more direct utility balancing exercise, the effect of which was severely to undercut the security of
the private property rights of plaintiffs in the name of societal advancement. In the midst of all the confusion in nuisance doctrine, however, the
New York Court of Appeals began to question its pro-industrial stance.
C.

The American Return to Traditional Principles

1.

The New York Example-After 1900

Only seven years after the strong pro-developmental stand taken by the
New York Court of Appeals in Booth v. Rome, Watertown & Ogdensburg
Terminal Railroad,'0 2 the court began to signal its retreat back toward traditional nuisance principles. Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 10 3 decided in 1900,
involved an upstream salt producer whose activities salinated a river used
by downstream farmers and mill operators. The trial court, operating
10 4
under a pro-industry rationale, denied the plaintiffs injunctive relief.
But the Court of Appeals rejected defendant's social utility arguments,
which drew support from Sanderson IV, 1 0 5 and granted the plaintiffs a new
98. WnLuAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 580 (1st ed. 1941) (commonly referred to as Prosseron Torts).
99. Lewin, supra note 30, at 212.
100. Id. at 214.
101. As compiled by Kurtz, supra note 41, at 656 n.178; see, e.g., McCarthy v. Bunker
Hill & Sullivan Mining & Con. Co., 164 F. 927 (9th Cir. 1908); Bliss v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 167 F. 342 (C.C.D. Mont. 1909); McElroy v. Kansas City, 21 F. 257
(C.C.W.D. Mo. 1884); Clifton Iron Co. v. Dye, 87 Alaska 468 (1888); Rouse v. Martin,
75 Alaska 510 (1883); Fisk v. City of Hartford, 40 A. 906 (Conn. 1898); Daniels v.

Koekuk Water Works, 61 Iowa 549 (1883); Boston Rolling Mills v. Cambridge, 117
Mass. 396 (1875); Potter v. Saginaw Union St. Ry., 47 N.W. 217 (Mich. 1890); Edwards

v. Allouez Mining Co., 38 Mich. 46 (1878); Fox v. Holcomb, 32 Mich. 494 (1875);
Demarest v. Hardham, 34 NJ. Eq. 469 (1881); Dorsey v. Allen, 85 N.C. 358 (1881);
Daughtry v. Warren, 85 N.C. 136 (1881); Brown v. Carolina Cent. Ry., 83 N.C. 128
(1880); Bourne v. Wilson-Case Lumber Co., 113 P. 52 (Or. 1911); Madison v. Ducktown
Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658 (Tenn. 1904); Galveston, Houston & San
Antonio Ry. v. Degroff, 118 S.W. 134 (Tex. 1909); Wees v. Coal & Iron Ry., 46 S.E. 166
(W. Va. 1903).
102. 140 N.Y. 267 (1893).
103. 164 N.Y. 303 (1900).

104. Id. at 313-15.
105. 113 Pa. 126.
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trial. 10 6 The court held that the Pennsylvania public interest doctrines had
10 7
never been adopted in New York.
In the 1903 case, Sammons v. City of Gloversville,10 8 the plaintiff sued
to enjoin a city from dumping sewage into a creek upon which his farm
was situated. The city argued that it was legislatively authorized to pollute
the creek based upon a city charter granting it power to construct a sewer
system. 10 9 The city further contended that permanently enjoining its activity would be contrary to an overwhelming public interest.1 10 Rejecting
these arguments, the court maintained that the city's polluting activities
constituted both a nuisance and a legislative taking, the latter being prohibited absent compensation." 1 The court held that the public interest could
not defeat issuance of an injunction where a substantially damaging nui1 12
sance had been found.
The New York Court of Appeals continued its march back toward
113
traditional common law principles in Whalen v. Union Bag & PaperCo.,
holding that the balance of interests test had no place in New York nuisance doctrine. In Whalen, the defendant owned a pulp mill valued at
$1,000,000 and employing 500 people. 1 14 The mill's operations polluted a
stream causing damage to a downstream riparian farmer. 115 Speaking
through Judge Werner, the Court of Appeals rejected the balancing test and
upheld the injunction, stating:
Although the damage to the plaintiff may be slight as compared with the
defendant's expense of abating the condition, that is not good reason for
refusing an injunction. Neither courts of equity nor law can be guided by
such a rule, for if followed to its logical conclusion it would deprive the poor
litigant of his little property by giving it to those already rich. It is always to
be remembered in such cases that "denying the injunction puts the hardship
on the party in whose favor the legal right exists, instead of on the
wrongdoer."116
This trio of cases had a significant impact on New York nuisance doctrine because it retreated from the doctrine of legislative authorization,
refused to allow public interest considerations to justify pollution, and
rejected the balance of interests test. There is, however, nothing in these
opinions to suggest that the standard of care required of polluters was anything stricter than non-negligence. Indeed, the Strobel court adhered to the
reasonable use rule, a negligence standard, as opposed to the strict liability
106. Strobel, 164 N.Y. at 317-23.

107. Id. at 320.
108. 175 N.Y. 346 (1903).
109. Id. at 351.
110. Id. at 352.

111. Id. at 353.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
208 N.Y. 1 (1913).

Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 5, quoting 5 Pommoy's EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 530.
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natural flow doctrine for riparian land owners. 1 17 This trio, with few
changes, defined New York nuisance law as it existed from the turn of the
century through 1970, the year the landmark decision of Boomer v. Atlantic
Cement Co. 118 was handed down.
Boomer may be viewed as the paradigm for the modern-day application
of nuisance law in environmental torts. It has been praised for creating an
innovative remedy for those injured by industrial pollution.1 19 Some, however, question the wisdom and inovation of the Boomer court's use of a
conditional injunction in this scenario. 120 The case plays a significant role
in this discussion not only because its arguably novel remedy serves as a
good foundation for later comparison between damages and injunctive
relief as remedies, 12 1 but also because it may represent a return to traditional nuisance doctrine and the use of strict liability.
Boomer involved a dispute between a cement plant and surrounding
landowners. 12 2 As an external byproduct of its industrial operations, the
plant injected large amounts of cement dust into the atmosphere. 1 23 The
trial court found that Atlantic's operations constituted a nuisance, but
refused injunctive relief because of the social utility, or benefit to society, of
the cement plant's activities. 12 4 However, the trial court did award tempo125
rary damages to the plaintiffs.
Unlike the lower courts, the New York Court of Appeals was more willing to grant injunctive relief to the plaintiffs. The court's willingness is best
explained by detailing the dilemma it faced. Initially, it considered "the
large disparity in economic consequences of the nuisance and injunction," 126 an argument inviting them to compromise the plaintiffs' property
rights in favor of industry. Next, it considered "[the] doctrine .

.

. that

where a nuisance has been found and where there has been any substantial
1 27
damage shown by the party complaining an injunction will be granted."
The court saw no way of reconciling the two doctrines because granting an
injunction would have perverse economic consequences, but not granting
117. Strobel, 164 N.Y. at 320. Kennedy v. Moog, Inc., 264 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1965) dem-

onstrates the precedential weight of the Strobel, Sammons and Whalen trio of decisions.
In Kennedy, the supreme court for Erie County granted an injunction to small holding
plaintiffs against the defendant sewage disposal plant. Id. at 616.
118. 257 N.E.2d 870.
119. See, e.g., JOHN E. BoNiNE & THOMAS 0. McGARrry, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 246 (1984).
120. See, e.g., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (Jason, J, dissenting) (questioning the wisdom of
the majority's remedy). See, e.g., Halper, supra note 41, at 301-302 (questioning the
uniqueness of the Boomer remedy). Halper notes that the Court of Appeals was fashioning Boomer-type remedies against nuisance harm at the turn of this century. Id. at 34149.
121. See infra Part III, sec. B.
122. 257 N.E.2d at 871.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 872.
125. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 287 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Sup. Ct. 1967), affd, 294
N.Y.S.2d 452 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968), rev'd, 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970).
126. 257 N.E.2d at 872.
127. Id.
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an injunction would leave the plaintiffs property rights unprotected. 128
The doctrine that forced the Court to consider the "disparity in economic consequences" was none other than the interest balancing test.
From the language of the opinion, the true nature of the second doctrine is
slightly more elusive. But a convincing argument can be made that the
court was actually referring to the strict liability sic utere tuo rule of classic
nuisance law. The language used by the court contains no reference to
negligence or fault. The court states only that where a nuisance and substantial damage are found, an injunction shall issue. 1 29 By holding that
the cement company's activities were reasonable in light of its location or
that the cement company was not operating negligently, the court could
have etched out an effective right on the part of cement plant to release its
emissions under a reasonableness standard. But it chose not to create such
a right; instead, the court applied a strict liability rule.
However, because the court's statement of this second doctrine contains a good measure of ambiguity, it is difficult to determine its parameters. Was the court simply referring to Whalen's rejection of interest
balancing, as Lewin suggests? 130 Was it assuming that a reasonableness
standard would be used in determining the existence of a nuisance? From
the language of the opinion, it is not clear to which doctrine the court was
referring; although its refusal to avail itself of the opportunity to find no
negligence suggests that the court assumed a strict liability standard
applied.
What is clear is the court's perceived dilemma. Under the first balancing of interests doctrine, the smallholding plaintiff would surely lose. On
the other hand, under the traditional doctrine, an injunction would necessarily issue against a large industrial operation. Neither result appeared
just to the court, so it fashioned a compromise in the remedial process.
After considering the option of granting a postponed injunction to afford
the cement company sufficient time to abate the nuisance, the court
granted an injunction against Atlantic's operating the cement plant until
such time as Atlantic paid permanent damages to the plaintiff for the harm
permanent damages, then the
caused by the nuisance. 13 1 If Atlantic13paid
2
court would not issue the injunction.
It remains unclear why the Boomer decision has become perhaps the
most famous nuisance case in American legal history. As previously suggested, its remedy is not particularly novel, considering the fact that the
New York Court of Appeals was using the same remedy in similar nuisance
actions at the turn of the century. 13 3 Perhaps Boomer's notoriety is a product of its strategic placement upon the legal history time-line. Decided in
1970, Boomer could be cast as the great gate-keeper to the federal statutory
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id.
See Lewin, supra note 30, at 217.
257 N.E.2d at 875.
Id. at 873-75.
See supra note 120.
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environmental law period in which we live today. Maybe the simplest reason for Boomer's fame is that for the purposes of teaching nuisance law in
American law schools, Boomer provides an excellent fact scenario for teasing out the principles of various nuisance doctrines. Although Boomer may
be perceived as epitomizing a common law response to the demands of a
more environmentally conscious society, an even more revolutionary environmental common law doctrine had been developed by Oregon's highest
court a decade prior to Boomer.
2. The Oregon Example
In the 1959 decision, Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co.,134 the Supreme Court
of Oregon launched a vigorous common law attack against environmental
injury. In the context of a classic industrial pollution scenario, the court
created a modem property rights-based common law doctrine suitable to
the challenges of the approaching environmental era. Before setting forth
the details of the Martin doctrine, however, a brief reconsideration of the
historic distinction between trespass and nuisance is required.
As discussed in Part II.A, historically, a cause of action for trespass
required a direct physical intrusion upon a property holder's possession.
interference with a
Nuisance, on the other hand, required consequential
135
property holder's right to enjoy and use her land.
The distinction between trespass and nuisance actions can be unclear.
Suppose, for example, that Arthur conducts blasting activities on his land
such that rocks are thrown onto Galahad's land. Trespass, it could be
argued, would lay for the harm Galahad suffers because rocks directly
invaded Galahad's possession. On the other hand, could it not just as easily be argued that nuisance is Galahad's remedy? After all, Galahad's harm
was a consequence of Arthur's activities conducted while upon his own
land. In fact, it was the latter argument that was accepted in the Hay case,
where the New York Supreme Court granted the plaintiff relief on an action
136
brought in case.
The previous example is easily applied in a pollution situation.
Instead of conducting blasting activities, suppose that Arthur operates a
cement plant that deposits dust on Galahad's adjoining land. This scenario
has been treated as a classic nuisance case. 13 7 But could it not just as
easily be argued that a trespass occurred? Even though invisible particles
were the offending agent, would not their intrusion upon Galahad's possession constitute a direct physical invasion?
These examples demonstrate that the question of whether a plaintiff
has a remedy under classic notions of trespass or nuisance can easily
become dependant upon a court's willingness to accept ridiculous seman134. 342 P.2d 790 (Or. 1959).
135. See supra notes 29.41 and accompanying text.

136. Hay v. Cohoes Co., 3 Barb. 42, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848), affd by 2 N.Y. 159, 163
(1848) (Court of Appeals held defendant liable for "caus[ing] a direct and immediate
injury" on an action brought in case.).
137. See, e.g., Boomer, 257 N.E.2d 870.
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tic arguments. Although largely relegated to history, the distinction
between direct and consequential harm has still caused problems in this
century. 13 8 The question of plaintiffs' ability to allege facts sufficient to
support a legal action brought in trespass became critical in Oregon (and
in other jurisdictions) not only because nuisance developed into a weaker
remedy than trespass, but also because the statute of limitations for13a 9trespass action was three times longer than that for a nuisance action.
The Oregon Supreme Court's landmark environmental decision, Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 14° must be read in light of a prior classic nuisance case decided by that court in 1948, Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland
Meadows. 14 1 In PortlandMeadows, the plaintiff owned an outdoor movie
theater.14 2 The defendant operated a race track on a lot adjoining the
plaintiffs land. 14 3 Bright lights from the defendant's race track made it
impossible for the plaintiff to operate its business. 14 4 The state supreme
court dismissed the plaintiffs contention that the defendant's activities created an action in trespass, stating, "the mere suggestion that the casting of
light upon the premises of a plaintiff would render a defendant liable without proof of any actual damage, carries its own refutation." 145 The court
next considered the plaintiffs argument that the lights from the racetrack
constituted a nuisance under the sic utere tuo rule.' 4 6 In rejecting this contention, the court squarely adopted the reasonable use rule as stated in the
Restatement of Torts.' 4 7 Relying on what it considered the substantial
held
social utility of the "highly beneficial element" 148 of light, the1 court
49
that the defendant's use of light did not constitute a nuisance.
In Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co.,' 5 0 the plaintiffs complained that
Reynolds Metal's operation of an aluminum reduction plant caused airborne fluoride gases and particulates to settle on their land, making it unfit
for raising livestock Plaintiffs sued the defendant for trespass.15 ' The
defendant, relying on Amphitheater and insisting that no action in trespass
could be brought on the basis of consequential invasions of property interests, contended that the plaintiffs' only action was in nuisance.' 5 2 The
plaintiffs problem stemmed from the statute of limitations, under which a
nuisance claim would allow plaintiffs damages for only two years of harm
suffered prior to filing the action, while a trespass claim would allow six
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

DONAHUE, supra note 45, at 223-27.
Id. See also Martin, 342 P.2d 790, 791.
342 P.2d 790 (Or. 1959).
198 P.2d 847 (Or. 1948).
Id. at 848.

See

143. Id.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 850.
Id.
Id. at 851.
Id. at 852.
Id. at 858.

149. Id.
150. 342 P.2d 790.
151. Id. at 791.
152. Id. at 794.
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53
years worth of damages.'
The first sentence of the Martin opinion is perhaps the most instructive: "This is an action of trespass." 154 In responding to the defendant's
argument that the injury suffered by the plaintiff was merely consequential,
the court launched into a scientific exposition regarding the "physical and
chemical nature of the substance which was deposited upon plaintiffs'
land" in which it described the reduction process that gave rise to the formation of the invading fluoride wastes.' 5 5 Within this scientific framework, it considered the traditional distinction between trespass and
nuisance, focusing upon the issue of direct versus consequential
15 6
invasion.
It is quite possible that in an earlier day when science had not yet peered
into the molecular and atomic world of small particles, the courts could not
fit an invasion through unseen physical instrumentalities into the requirement that a trespass can result only from a direct invasion. But in the atomic
age even the uneducated know the great and awful force contained in the
atom and what it can do to a man's property if it is released. In fact, the now
famous equation E=mc' has taught us that mass and157
energy are equivalents
and that our concept of "things" must be reframed.

Viewed in light of the historical division between actions in trespass
and nuisance actions in case, the court's scientific discussion is revolutionary. For centuries, the distinction between direct and consequential injury
was of paramount importance in determining whether a plaintiff had
alleged facts sufficient to afford a remedy. Here, where the plaintiff's correct or incorrect allegation of trespass would mean the difference of four
years' worth of damages, the Supreme Court of Oregon questioned the wisdom that lay at the very foundation of such a distinction. At the atomic
level, the court rhetorically inquired, are not all nuisances really trespasses
anyway?
After breaking down the historical distinction between trespass and
nuisance, the court determined that the true inquiry in a case involving the
invasion of property interests, quite apart from investigating the directness
of the injury, was simply whether the defendant's actions violated a legally
protected interest of the plaintiff.158 The inquiry fell into two parts. First,
the court held that it needed to determine whether the plaintiff had a
legally protected interest. 159 Second, continued the court, if it determined
that the plaintiff's interest was worthy of legal protection, it then needed to
determine if that interest was substantially invaded by the defendant's conduct. 160 It was through the dynamic relationship between these two
inquiries that it became apparent to the Martin court that the laws of nui153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 791.
Id.
Id. at 791-92.
Id. at 793.
Id. (emphasis in the original).
Id. at 794.
Id.
Id.

1997

Common Law, Property Rights and the Environment

sance and trespass "came very close to merging."16 1
The Martin court noted that trespass and nuisance effectively merge in
the sense that "when inquiry is made as to whether the plaintiffs interest
falls within the ambit of trespass law the courts look at the interference
with the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of his land to determine whether his
interest in exclusive possession should be protected and thus the two torts
coalesce." 162 In other words, the historical nuisance inquiry that focuses
its analysis upon the use and enjoyment of land was really the first part of
the Martin court's new two-part analysis. Under Martin, when a plaintiff
proves that another has interfered with the use and enjoyment of his land,
he implicitly proves that he has a legally protected interest in possession.
The second part of the analysis then comes to the forefront. Is the defendant's intruding activity substantial enough to demand legal redress?
The two inquiries are contextually interrelated. The second inquiry
into the substantiality of the harm caused by defendant's intrusion must be
evaluated in relation to the plaintiffs interest.1 63 "The broader and more
diverse the possessor's protectable interests the more sensitive they are to
the violation by the defendant and the easier it is to find that his conduct,
although apparently inconsequential, gives rise to liability."'

64

In other

words, according to Martin, a court must determine the scope of the plaintiff's property interests from the vantage point of the property-holding
plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiffs perspective should dictate the grounds under
which the substantiality of the defendant's invasion is to be determined.
The court concluded that theoretically broad visions of property interests
inhering in the plaintiff could mean that any invasion of the plaintiffs
property interests would be substantial, as was true under historical trespass notions. 165 Thus, actual damage would not necessarily be a required
ingredient under this nuisance/trespass hybrid. Thus, held Martin, if a
court cannot determine a perfectly just resolution between the plaintiff and
the defendant, it should err on the side of upholding property rights
against interference. 1 6 6 The court in Martin had no trouble determining
that the defendant's polluting activities fulfilled all the requirements of this
16 7
trespass doctrine.
In summary, the Martin court created a nuisance/trespass hybrid, to
which it attached the label of trespass. This common law action against
property invasion involved a two-part inquiry: first, whether the plaintiff
had a legally protected property interest, and second, whether that interest
was substantially invaded or harmed. 168 The two inquiries were dynamically and contextually related in that the substantiality of the defendant's
invasion into the plaintiffs property right was positively related to the
161. Id. at 795.
162. Id. (emphasis in the original).

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 796.
Id.
Id. at 795-96.
Id. at 796-97.
Id. at 797.

168. Id. at 793-94.
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breadth of the plaintiffs legally protected interest.16 9 The existence and
scope of the plaintiffs property right was to be determined from the vantage point of the plaintiff, so that any errors in dispute resolution would be
in favor of protecting plaintiffs' property rights from invasion. No inquiry
was made into .the directness or indirectness of the invasion, for the findings of modern science proved the futility of legal standards founded upon
such a distinction. Additionally, no inquiry was made into the standard of
care employed by the defendant in conducting its activities because all that
mattered was the invasion. Thus, in 1959, the Martin court created a modem, concise, property rights-based common law doctrine that stood ready
to tackle the pollution problems of modem society.
D. A Comparative Look at the Development of Nuisance Law in
England
The following is a comparative analysis of the development of English nuisance law. Although English courts briefly flirted with the reasonableness
standard in the mid-nineteenth century, unlike its American counterpart,
English nuisance law remained on the strict liability standard until the
1960s. In recent decades, however, the House of Lords has significantly
undermined the strength of English nuisance law by requiring plaintiffs to
show that harm suffered from property encroachments was reasonably
foreseeable.
1. A Brief Flirtationwith the Reasonableness Standard
The 1858 case of Hole v. Barlow170 involved a manufacturer of bricks
whose activities caused a "noxious and unwholesome vapour to arise" 171
to the injury of the plaintiffs residential premises and garden spot. The
trial judge instructed the jury that "no action lies for the use, the reasonable use, of a lawful trade in a convenient and proper place," and the jury
returned a verdict for the defendant.1 72 On appeal, the Common Bench
upheld the trial judge's rule of reasonable use in a convenient and proper
73
place.1
Four years later, in the case of Bamford v. Turnley,174 the Exchequer
chamber took the opportunity to reconsider and reject the Hole rule. The
facts of Bamford, which also involved a brick manufacturer, were indistinguishable from Hole.175 The plaintiff relied on the strict liability statement
of nuisance in William Aldred's Case176 to argue that Hole was wrongly
17 8
decided 17 7. The court agreed with the plaintiff and overruled Hole.
169. Id.

170.
171.
172.
173.

4 C.B. (N.S.) 334 (1858).
Id.
Id. at 335.
Id. at 337.

174. 3 B. & S. 66 (Ex. 1862).

175. Id.
176. 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (C.P. 1611); see also supranotes 35-38 and accompanying text.
177. Bamford, 3 B. & S. at 68-69.

178. Id. at 76-78.
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Justice Bramwell's opinion in the Bamford case sharply contrasts the
New York nuisance law developments that were contemporaneously occurring. 17 9 Bramwell rejected the same public benefit justification for causing
a nuisance that the New York court accepted when he stated the following:
But it is said that, temporary or permanent, [causing a nuisance] is lawful
because it is for the public benefit. Now, in the first place, that law to my
mind is a bad one which, for the public benefit, inflicts loss on an individual
without compensation. But further, with great respect, I think this consideration misapplied in this and in many other cases. The public consists of all
the individuals of it, and a thing is only for the public benefit when it is
productive of good to those individuals on the balance of loss and gain to all.
So that if all the loss and all the gain were borne and received by one individual, he on the whole would be a gainer. But whenever this is the case,whenever a thing is for the public benefit, properly understood,-the loss to
the individuals of the public
who lose will bear compensation out of the
180
gains of those who gain.
Bramwell agreed that brick manufacturing provided benefits to the public.
But he insisted that public benefit provided no excuse for allowing a party
to escape liability for the harm he may cause to other members of society
because the very concept of public benefit implies that all costs are taken
into account in its determination.
Justice Bramwell also raised another important issue in his opinion.
He recognized a pragmatic limitation upon the strict liability of the sic
utere tuo rule. Bramwell noted instances of "burning weeds, emptying cesspools, making noises during repairs, and other instances that would be
nuisances if done wantonly or maliciously," 18 1 but nevertheless may be
lawfully done. These instances, he held, must have some basis for exception from strict liability. 182 Bramwell stated that the principle for excepting such activities is "that those acts necessary for the common and
ordinary use and occupation of land and houses may be done, if conveniently done, without subjecting those who do them to an action." 183 He
called these necessary acts "reciprocal nuisances."18 4 He cautioned that
such a principle would not apply to an industrial pollution case like
Bamford "where what has been done was not the using of land in a common and ordinary way, but in an exceptional manner-not unnatural nor
18 5
unusual, but not the common and ordinary use of land."
2. Rylands v. Fletcher-A Continuation of Strict Liability Nuisance Law
The case of Fletcher v. Rylands' 8 6 was considered by the Exchequer Cham179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
3 B. & S. at 84-85.
Id. at 83.
Id. at 83.
Id.
Id. at 84.

185. Id. at 83.

186. 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (1866).
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ber in 1866 and then, as Rylands v. Fletcher,1 8 7 by the House of Lords in
1868. The plaintiff in Rylands was the lessee of a mine. The defendant
owned a mill on land adjoining the plaintiff's.' 8 8 The defendant constructed a reservoir on his land without realizing that a series of mine
shafts lay below its surface.' 9 The water from the defendant's reservoir
broke through these shafts and flooded the plaintiff's mine. 190 The
Exchequer Chamber, per Justice Blackburn, held the defendant absolutely
liable for the damage caused by the reservoir stating the rule to be "that the
person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and
keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at
his peril."19 1 The House of Lords, per Lord Chancellor Cairns, sought to
cast more light on Blackburn's reasoning by articulating a "natural user"
principle, which stated that "if, by the operation of the laws of nature, that
occupied by the Plainaccumulat.on of water had passed off into the close
19 2
tiff, the Plaintiff could not have compained.... "
Scholars have presented Rylands as the historical source of modem
strict liability theory. 19 3 It has also been viewed as a doctrine of its own,
related to, but separate from nuisance law. 19 4 However, in his seminal article, The Boundariesof Nuisance,195 Professor Newark demonstrates that the
rule in Rylands was simply a restatement of common law nuisance. Of
Rylands, Professor Newark states the following:
This case is generally regarded as an important landmark-indeed, a turning
point-in the law of tort; but an examination of the judgments shows that
those who decided it were quite unconscious of any revolutionary or reactionary principles implicit in the decision. They thought of it as calling for
no more than a restatement of settled principles, and Lord Cairns went so
far as to describe those principles as "extremely simple." And in fact the
the prinmain principle involved was extremely simple, being no more than
19 6
ciple that negligence is not an element in the tort of nuisance.
187. 3 L.TR-H.L. 330 (1868).
188. Id. at 331-32.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. 1 L.RL-Ex. 265 at 279.
192. 3 L.R.-H.L. 330 at 338. Of Cairns's opinion, a noted British nuisance law scholar
said the following: "[Ilt was unfortunate that Lord Cairns thought that his own paraphrase would cast additional light. To attempt to improve on Blackburn J.'s carefully
worded judgments is never a worthwhile occupation." F. H. Newark, Non-Natural User
and Rylands v. Fletcher, 24 MODERN L. REV. 557, 561-62 (1961).
193. See, e.g., J ms A. HENDERSON E AL., T-E TORTs PROcEss 535-60 (4th Ed. 1994).
Henderson and his co-authors implicitly present Rylands as standing for the proposition
that uncommon ultrahazardous activities are subject to absolute liability. Id. at 551-52,
citing George Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HALv. L. REv. 537, 547-48
(1972).
194. See, e.g., A.J. Waite, Private Civil Litigation and the Environment, LAND MGMr. &
ENvn. L. REP., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 113, 114-15; Cambridge Water Co. v. Eastern Counties Leather Plc., 2 W.L.R. 53, 71 (H.L. 1994) (opinion of Lord Goff of Chieveley).
195. F.H. Newark, The Boundaries of Nuisance, 65 L.Q. REv. 480 (1949).
196. Id. at 487.
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In his article, Newark sets out to dispel the confusion that had arisen
during the turn of the twentieth century regarding the topic of nuisance
law. He traces nuisance to its early roots in Glanvill's time and concludes
that it was fundamentally a tort to land. 197 The distinction between nuisance and trespass, of course, was that trespass arose from a defendant's
actions upon a plaintiffs land, while nuisance arose from a defendant's
actions beyond a plaintiffs land, the result of which the defendant nevertheless caused harm indirectly. 19 8 According to Newark, the confusion in
nuisance began when seventeenth and eighteenth century judges, seeking
to develop the legal principle of negligence, stretched it into the sphere of
physical injury. 1 99 The typical fact pattern of the cases to which the principle was applied involved a defendant leaving the flap door to his cellar
open so that it stuck out into the road.200 The plaintiff would be riding
happily down the rode on his horse when, not seeing the flap, he would
collide with it and injur himself.2 01 Lacking any better form of action to
provide recovery for plaintiffs' in this situation, judges would allow recovery in nuisance. 20 2 Essentially, Newark argues that, as a result of the infection of personal injury concepts into the realm of nuisance, the torts of
negligence and nuisance became inextricably intertwined. 20 3 It was this
blurring of distinctions that caused Rylands to be misinterpreted as being a
revolutionary strict liability case when, in fact, it was merely restating the
tautology that negligence is not an element in the tort of nuisance. 20 4 Professor Newark does admit one item of novelty in the Rylands decision, however. He agrees that, as between adjoining land owners, Rylands
determined that an isolated escape (as opposed to an ongoing barrage of
20 5
property encroachments) is actionable.
This absolute liability rule of nuisance law was reaffirmed as the turn
of the twentieth century approached and passed. Two cases illustrate this
pattern. In the 1885 case, Ballard v. Tomlinson,20 6 the defendant constructed a drainage system from the water-closet in his printing-house to a
deep well for the purposes of dumping raw sewage into the well. The plaintiff owned a brewery operation and drew water from the same percolating
source through a well on his own land. 20 7 The only real issue in the case

was whether the plaintiff possessed a sufficient property interest in the percolating water as to support an action for nuisance. 20 8 Once the court
determined that the plaintiff had such an interest, there was no further
inquiry; the defendant was held liable for his harm causing activities
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 482.
Id. at 481-82.
Id. at 483-86.
Id. at 484-85.

201. Id.

202. Id.
203. Id.

204. Id. at 487.
205. Id. at 488.
206. 29 Ch. D. 115 (1882).
207. Id. at 116

208. Id. at 120.
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regardless of negligence. 20 9 In the 1909 case, West v. Bristol Tramways
Co., 2 10 fumes from the chemically treated wood along the defendant's

tramline damaged the plants and shrubs in the plaintiffs nursery garden.
The plaintiff, a market gardener, recovered in nuisance from the tramline
company, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant was not found to be
21
negligent. '
In summary, the supposedly novel "Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher" is no
more than a restatement of the classic sic utere tuo rule of nuisance which
was reaffirmed in Bamford v. Turnley.212 This pattern of reaffirmation con-

tinued. While American nuisance law underwent a significant weakening
process after the Civil War and through the turn of the twentieth century,2 13 British courts retained a strong nuisance law that held defendants
absolutely liable for the harm their activities caused. As Newark explains,
however, English nuisance law continued to contain many confusing elements arising from the injection of physical injury into the nuisance con2 14
ception and uncertainty about the simple nature of the Rylands holding.
Furthermore, the temptation to place nuisance on a reasonableness stan2 15
dard as the court did in Hole v. Barlow, persisted.
3.

The English Weakening of Nuisance Through the Requirement of
Foreseeability of Damages
At least twice beginning in the 1960s, the House of Lords had the occasion
to consider the issue of foreseeability of damages as a justification for dismissing claims against nuisance causing defendants. One of these occasions occurred in the Wagon Mound (No. 2)216 case. In that case, the
209. Id. at 122, 124, 126.
210. 2 K.B. 14 (1908).
211. Id. at 21-22.
212. 3 B. & S. 66 (Ex. 1862).
213. See supra Part II.B.1.
214. See generally Newark, supra note 192.
215. See Hole v. Barlow, 4 C.B. (N.S.) 334 (1858); see, e.g., Andreae v. Selfridge & Co.
Ltd., 1938 Ch. 1 (in case where plaintiff hotel operator sued defendant construction
company for injury resulting from the demolition and building activities of defendant on

adjoining property, court affirmed verdict for plaintiff but decreased damages based on a
theory of reasonableness). In contrast with the Oregon Supreme Court's holding in
Martin v. Reynolds, supra notes 150-69 and accompanying text, it is worth noting the
case, Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Southport Corp., 1956 App. Cas. 218 (H.L. 1956). In
Esso, bad weather and mechanical malfunctions forced a ship, for purposes of safety to
vessel and crew, to discharge the oil it was carrying as cargo into the Irish Sea, just off

the coast of Preston. Ocean waves carried the oil until it washed up onto plaintiff's land
on the banks of the River Ribble. Plaintiff brought actions in negligence, nuisance and
trespass, but failed to recover for damage suffered. The court decided the case solely
upon the issue of negligence, but two Lords offered dictum to the effect that, on the
facts, no trespass action could be supported either. Id. at 242, 244. Lord Tucker's reason for so concluding was because the harm plaintiff's suffered was not direct. Id. at

244. Lord Tucker reached his conclusion on the issue of trespass only a few years before
the Oregon Supreme Court, under similar facts (pollutants carried by natural means
from their source to plaintiff's land), and eliminated the direct versus indirect distinction between nuisance and trespass. See supra notes 150-69 and accompanying text.
216. Overseas Tankship (U.K), Ltd. v. Miller Steamship Co. Pty., 1967 App. Cas. 617
(P.C. 1967) [hereinafter Wagon Mound (No. 2)].
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defendant chartered the sea vessel, the Wagon Mound, which was docked at
a wharf in Sydney Harbour. 2 17 At a nearby wharf, the plaintiff had two
ships that were undergoing repairs. 2 18 In the course of doing the repairs
the owners of that wharf were carrying on welding activities that caused
hot pieces of metal to fly off and fall into the sea.2 19 During the night,
careless engineers caused a large quantity of oil to spill out of the Wagon
Mound.220 The oil collected in the wharf at which the plaintiffs ships were
docked. 22 1 Naturally, sparks from welding set fire to the oil, which spread
throughout the wharf causing damage to plaintiff's vessels. 22 2 The plaintiff
22 3
brought actions alternatively in nuisance and negligence.
The Privy Council's main concern was the unforeseeabiity of the
damages. This lack of foreseeability was sufficient to overcome the negligence claim and prevent the plaintiff's from recovering damages. The real
problem the Privy Council faced, however, was whether lack of foreseeability could prevent the plaintiff from recovering damages under the absolute
liability notion of nuisance. 2 24 That is why they stated the issue as
"whether [plaintiff] can recover notwithstanding the finding that [the dam22 5
age] was not foreseeable."
Next, the Privy Council began to explore the "dose relation between
nuisance and negligence" 2 26 in an attempt to determine whether foreseeability is an essential element of nuisance. The Privy Council was forced to
admit that "negligence is not an essential element in determining liability
for nuisance." 22 7 But after admitting such, they broadened the definition
of nuisance to such an extent as to destroy its technical meaning by stating
that "[n]uisance is a term used to cover a wide variety of tortious acts or
ommisions and in many negligence in the narrow sense is not essential."2 28 In essence, the Privy Council held that "nuisance" is really a synonym for "tort." As such, some nuisances (or torts) require a finding of
negligence, and some do not. Having made these assumptions, the Privy
Council was only a short step away from applying the foreseeability
requirement to nuisance. If foreseeability can be applied to those nuisances (torts) where negligence is an essential element for recovery, then
there is no reason to discriminate against such nuisances in favor of nuisances (torts) that do not require negligence. The Privy Council stated the
proposition as follows:
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.

220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.

224. Id. at 636.
225. Id.

226. Id. at 637.
227. Id. at 639.
228. Id.
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It could not be right to discriminate between different cases of nuisances
so as to make foreseeability a necessary element in determining damages in
those cases where it is a necessary element in determining liability, but not
in others. So the choice22is9 between it being a necessary element in all cases
of nuisance or in none.
After creating this false dilemma, the Privy Council opted for the latter
choice.
The problem with the Privy Council's reasoning in Wagon Mound (No.
2) is that the foreseeability exception it created to the strict liability rule of
nuisance effectively swallows the rule in two respects. First, absolute liability should mean absolute liability. If the unforeseeability of damages is
allowed to prevent a plaintiff's recovery under a strict liability rule, liability
can hardly be called absolute. Second, the Privy Council went too far in
equating the narrow action of nuisance with the broad category of tort. If
such an equation, in fact, represents reality, then the sic utere tuo rule of
nuisance is dead, and the exception has truly devoured the rule.
More recently, the House of Lords had the opportunity to consider this
foreseeability issue again in the 1994 case Cambridge Water Co. v. Eastern
Counties Leather Plc.230 In CambridgeWater, the defendants, leather manufacturers, used chlorinated solvents to degrease pelts at their tannery
23 1
approximately one to three miles from the plaintiff's water borehole.
23 2
The plaintiff was a municipal water company.
Approximately fifteen
years before plaintiffs brought this action, the defendants' solvents seeped
into the ground and through a complicated process they could not have
2 33
foreseen, made water from the borehole unfit for human consumption.
The water company brought an action for damages on alternative grounds
4
of negligence, nuisance, and the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.2
Speaking for the House of Lords, Lord Goff of Chieveley defined the
issue as whether foreseeabiity of damages was a necessary element of the
rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.3 5 A conclusion in the affirmative was a simple
matter of wedding nuisance (which under the Wagon Mound (No. 2) was
held to a foreseeability requirement) together with the rule in Rylands v.
Fletcher. Goff began this quest by reviewing the history of nuisance and
exploring the relationship between nuisance and the rule in Rylands v.
Fletcher.236 Goff took Professor Newark's argument 23 7 that Ryland's v.
Fletcherwas merely a statement that negligence played no part in the determination of nuisance and made it stand for the proposition that nuisance
and the rule in Ryland v. Fletcher bore a close historical connection to one
229. Id. at 640.
230. 2 W.L.R. 53 (H.L. 1994).

231. Id.
232. Id. at 57.
233. Id.

234.
235.
236.
237.

at 59-60.

Id. at 57.
2 W.LR. at 76.
Id. at 72.
See supra notes 192-205 and accompanying text.
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another. 2 38 Lord Goff stated his belief based upon Wagon Mound (No.2)
that "the development of the law of negligence in the past 60 years points
strongly towards a requirement that such foreseeability should be a prerequisite of liability in damages for nuisance .
-239 Next he reasoned that
the close historical tie between nuisance and Rylands led to the conclusion
that foreseeability of damage is an essential element under the rule in
Rylands v. Fletcher.240 Finally addressing an argument that a strict liability
Rylands rule would be in closer harmony with recent tough environmental
legislation, Goff responded that, on the contrary, the fact of tougher legislation dictates a lesser need for common law. 2 4 1 He thus concluded that
"foreseeability of damage of the relevant type should be regarded as a pre24 2
requisite of liability in damages under the rule [in Rylands v. Fletcher]."
After Wagon Mound (No. 2) and Cambridge Water, is there any strict
liability left in English nuisance law? Goff's opinion answers this question
in the affirmative. He drew a distinction between a damages setting and an
injunction setting. He stated that where an injunction is sought, its purpose is to restrain further harmful action by the defendant. As a consequence, the defendant must be aware of the harm she causes. "It follows
that [cases where injunction are claimed] provide no guidance on the question whether foreseeability of harm of the relevant type is a prerequisite of
the recovery of damages ....
243" In short, strict liability is still the rule in
24 4
an injunction setting.
E. Summary
Nuisance began in England as a doctrine that delivered absolute protection
to property holders suffering injury to the use and enjoyment of their
land. 2 45 There was no inquiry into the reasonableness or social utility of
defendants' activities. 24 6 Furthermore, there was no balancing of interests. 2 4 7 After circa 1850, in New York and other jurisdictions, nuisance
law was transformed from a no fault liability concept into one based upon
negligence standards that required courts to balance not only the interests
of the respective parties to an action, but also public interests. 24 8 Such
balancing created a development-friendly nuisance doctrine that forced
those on whose behalf the doctrine was created to bear the "reasonable"
costs of industrial progress.
238. 2 W.L.R. at 72-74.
239. Id. at 75.
240. Id. at 78-79.
241. Id. at 80.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 75.
244. However, this conclusion rests upon a narrow reading of Wagon Mound (No. 2).
If the House of Lords meant what it said in that case, namely, that nuisance is merely
another word for tort, then the role of strict liability in an injunction setting is severely
undermined.
245. See supra notes 2941 and accompanying text.

246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See supra Part II.B.
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Almost immediately after the New York Court of Appeals announced
its reasonableness doctrine for nuisance in Booth, 24 9 it appears to have recognized that such a doctrine inflicted severe harm on small landholders.
One could hypothesize that New York judges began to perceive the scales of
justice tipping too far in favor of industry. Perhaps, as the modem era was
upon them, these judges recognized that industrial America was no longer
comprised of small and relatively powerless entrepreneurs arguably in
need of relief from no fault liability, but rather large scale operations with
political clout to match. Perhaps, in visionary fashion, they foresaw that
environmental concerns would become more significant as the world grew
smaller. But this musing probably attributes to these judges the type of
foresight that can only be achieved through hindsight.
The most exciting developments in American environmental common
law, however, occurred in Oregon around 1960. In Martin, the Oregon
Supreme Court not only returned to a traditional strict liability foundation,
but also created an entirely new and stream-lined common law environmental action.2 5 0 This nuisance and trespass hybrid rejected old common
law distinctions that no longer possessed any significance in the modem
era. The hybrid created a workable doctrine ready to respond to demands
of the environmental era. Because the Martin court developed such an
effective common law action against environmental harm, its work serves
as the foundation of the model common law environmental action offered
in Part III.
The development of English nuisance law was considerably different
than that of the United States doctrine. Although the Common Bench
briefly adopted a reasonableness standard in Hole v. Barlow,25 ' the Exchequer Chamber quickly overruled it. 2 5 2 Aside from this flirtation, nuisance
law in England remained founded upon strict liability until the 1960s, at
which time the House of Lords undermined the absolute liability of nuisance by imposing upon plaintiffs the burden of showing that damages
25 3
suffered from a nuisance were reasonably foreseeable.
III.

A Model Environmental Common Law

Recognizing that American and English developments significantly weakened nuisance law, the following discussion seeks to combine the best elements of nuisance law analysis from both countries into a model common
law environmental action. It draws primarily upon the Oregon Supreme
Court's Martin doctrine, 25 4 but also incorporates helpful rules and analyses from Lord Goffs opinion in Cambridge Water2 55 as well as Justice
249. 140 N.Y. 267 (1893).
250. See supra notes 150-69 and accompanying text.
251. 4 C.B. (N.S.) 334 (1858).
252. Bamford, 3 B. & S. 66 (1862).
253. See supra Part ll.D.3.
254. See supra notes 150-69 and accompanying text.

255. See supra notes 230-44 and accompanying text.
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Bramwell's opinion in Bamford v. Turnley.25 6 The model is outlined in a
three-part analysis designed to formulate a viable common law response to
pollution problems. The analysis explores the following issues: 1) the
legal remedy to be used when protecting a plaintiffs property right from
encroachment, 2) the standard of care or duty owed to the plaintiff by the
defendant in pollution cases, and 3) valid defenses that may be raised in
pollution cases. Additionally, it briefly revisits the Martin standard for
determining substantial harm. If a plaintiff proves substantial harm from a
property encroachment under Martin's contextual standard, 257 the court
would apply the following analysis: 1) an injunction should issue against
the defendant's future polluting operations and damages would be due for
past injury to the plaintiff in the case of ongoing polluting activities, and 2)
the defendant would not be allowed to argue that she used all reasonable
care in conducting her activities; however, 3) the defendant could raise a
"coming to the nuisance" or "coming to the invasion" affirmative defense to
avoid the injunction.
In conformity with Martin's merger of trespass and nuisance, this
model sheds old labels in favor of a new one that describes the fundamental nature of trespass, nuisance and related actions. From this point forward, the environmental common law action described will be referred to
as an action against property encroachment.
A.

The Framework: The Coase Theorem

R.H. Coase's primary observation in his seminal article, The Problem of
Social Cost, was that voluntary market exchanges do not merely allocate
goods efficiently, they also allocate costs efficiently. As long as a liberal
bargaining environment continues to exist, Coase argued, parties who disagree over their respective land uses will always come to cost minimizing
agreements. 258 Coase stated the proposition as follows, "It is always possible to modify by transactions on the market the initial legal delimitation of
rights. And, of course, if such market transactions are costless, such a rearrangement of rights will always take place if it would lead to an increase in
the value of production."25 9 In other words, in the absence of transaction
costs, an efficient allocation of resources will always result, regardless of
how property rights are originally assigned.
The Coase Theorem is a defining work in law and economics scholarship.2 60 Ironically, however, if Coase's beginning assumption of costless
256. See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.

257. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
258. See generally Coase, supra note 12.
259. Id. at 15.
260. The study of law and economics is an application of economic and efficiency
analysis to legal issues. Whereas questions ofjustice and legality have historically dominated judicial inquiry, the study of law and economics advocates that efficiency considerations additionally be taken account of in the adjudicatory process. For an
A. STouT,
introduction to law and economics scholarship, see DAVID W. BARNES & LYNNru
LAv AND ECONOMICS: CASES AND MAra.uLts (1982) and RIcHARD A. PosNR, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAw (3d ed. 1986).
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transactions were an accurate description of real-world conditions, there
would be no need for a study of law and economics because courts' delimitations of rights would have no effect on the efficient allocation of
resources. Consequently, judges would have no need to concern themselves with economic considerations in determining their assignments of
property rights. In his article, Coase alludes to this result, stating that "if
market transactions were costless, all that matters (questions of equity
apart) is that the rights of the various parties should be well-defined and
the results of legal actions easy to forecast." 261 In the real world, however,
transactions are rarely, if ever, costless. As a result, Coase observes, in
situations where transaction costs are significant, courts' actions have a
direct impact upon economic activity. In light of this fact, Coase
concludes:
It would therefore seem desirable that the courts should understand the economic consequences of their decisions and should, insofar as this is possible without creating too much uncertainty about the legal position itself,
take these consequences into account when making their decisions. Even
when it is possible to change the legal delimitation of rights through market
transactions, it is obviously desirable to reduce the need for such transac26 2
tions and thus reduce the employment of resources in carrying them out.
Thus the existence of transactions costs provides continued vitality to the
school of law and economics. The remaining discussion is offered with
Coase's observations in mind.
B. The Remedy Issue: Calabresi and Melamed's "View of the
Cathedral" and Beyond
The presumption that transactions costs do not exist would dictate that it
makes no difference whether a court grants or stays the injunction in a
property encroachment setting. A court's determination to issue an injunction, under Coase's analysis, only demarcates the initial allocation of the
property right at issue. When a court grants an injunction, it recognizes
the plaintiffs property right, that is, the court finds that the plaintiff has a
right to be let alone in the quiet enjoyment of her property. On the other
hand, when a court refuses an injunction, it vests a property right in the
defendant and grants a right to the defendant to use the plaintiff's property
for pollution purposes. In either case, if the losing party values the property right more than the winner, an exchange will occur in which the losing
party will purchase the right from the winner so long as transactions costs
are less than the determined value of that right. Conversely, if the winning
party values the property right more than the loser, then no exchange will
occur, and the property right will still vest in the party that values it the
most. But, as Coase observed, transactions costs are almost always
present. 26 3
261. Coase, supra note 12, at 19.

262. Id.

263. Coase, supra note 12, at 15.
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Calabresi and Melamed, in their hallmark article PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, conclude that
because transfer costs exist, it is important for courts to possess a solid
framework for analyzing the question of assigning property rights. 26 4 In
the article, Calabresi and Melamed articulate a framework of "entitiements," protected by property, liability, or inalienability rules. They present this framework as follows:
An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that someone
who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him
in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed
upon by the seller. It is the form of entitlement which gives rise to the least
amount of state intervention: .... Whenever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively determined value for it,
an entitlement is protected by a liability rule.... An entitlement is inalienable to the extent that its transfer is not permitted between a willing buyer
and a willing seller ....

265
goods are mixed.

It should be clear that most entitlements to most

Under Calabresi and Melamed's framework, the concept of "private
property" may be viewed as an entitlement protected by a property rule.
When an entitlement is thus protected, the private property holder may not
be robbed of ownership unless he sells it voluntarily at a subjectively chosen price. Therefore, a court will enjoin any attempts to forcefully deprive
a property holder of his rights. Thus, property rules deliver relief in the
form of an injunction. Yet, as Calabresi and Melamed note, when a court
denies an injunction in a nuisance action and instead orders the payment
of damages, it has effectively abrogated the plaintiffs property right and
sustained the defendant's right to take the plaintiff's property for an objectively determined compensation. 266 In short, the court has given its blessing to a forced sale of property. In such a situation, according to Calabresi
and Melamed, private property may be said to be protected merely by a
2 67
liability rule.

The Calabresi and Melamed framework suggests that the distinction
between cases in which damages, as opposed to injunctive relief, is the
appropriate remedy inheres in the distinction between property and liability. If a right is protected by a property rule, then a court should issue an
injunction. On the other hand, if a right is protected by a liability rule, the
law permits the right to be destroyed and damages are the remedy. Their
framework is based upon the prevalence of an environment in which a free
exchange of rights can occur. 268 In brief, the framework suggests that
when transactions costs are low and a property right vests in the plaintiff, a
court should issue an injunction because, if the defendant values the
264. Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Inalien-

ability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L REv. 1089 (1972).

265. Id. at 1092-93.
266. Id. at 1092.
267. Id. at 1105. This latter result is the same as that dictated by the Boomer remedy.
See notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
268. Id. at 1106-10.
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assigned property entitlement more than the plaintiff, the parties may
freely exchange it. 26 9 On the other hand, if transactions costs are so high
as to prevent an exchange from occurring, and the property right vests in
the plaintiff, then a court should award damages because they embody the
court's objective determination of the value of the right and an approximation of the exchange that would have occurred had the plaintiff valued the
2 70
right more.
Calabresi and Melamed's distinction between liability and property
rules is useful, but its focus on transactions costs overlooks an even more
fundamental basis for distinguishing between those cases in which damage
awards rather than injunctive relief are appropriate. 27 1 The basic distinction between damages and injunctive relief, as alluded to by Lord Goff of
Chieveley in CambridgeWater Co. v. Eastern Leather Plc.,272 is essentially a
distinction between relief necessitated by past and future harm. An analysis of the nature of the damages remedy reveals its essence as a remedy for
past injury. When a plaintiff brings a legal action for past injury suffered
from pollution, he seeks compensation for that harm. Injunctions, on the
other hand, premised as they are upon the existence of an ongoing injurious intrusion, contemplate future harm. As such, they are preventative in
nature. The presumption therefore exists that damages cannot remedy
contemplated future harm because no injury yet exists that justifies compensation. In short, if a plaintiff seeks redress for past injury, the action is
for damages. If he seeks protection from future injury, the action is one for
an injunction.
It is in the context of future injury that Calabresi and Melamed's transaction costs argument becomes important. Within this context, the ques269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Although the following discussion considers when injunctions, not damages, are
the appropriate remedy in pollution settings, a prior question, posed by Coase's analy-

sis, is why an injunction should be granted at all. In the absence of transactions costs, it
does not matter to whom a property right is given because the principles of exchange
dictate that it will eventually fall into the hands of the party who values it the most. In
pollution cases, why should a court not simply refuse an injunction and allow the plaintiffs to pay the defendants to reduce their pollution? At least two reasons support the
award of an injunction in pollution settings. First, an injunction functions to clearly
define property rights. Not issuing an injunction when pollution occurs creates a
murky atmosphere for exchange. Denying an injunction may not necessarily mean that
the defendant owns the right to pollute, but rather it may only mean that the plaintiff
has not proven harm. Because it is unclear whether the right vests in the plaintiff or in
the defendant, exchange is undermined. Injunctions, on the other hand, unequivocally
determine in whom property rights are vested. Therefore, the denial of an injunction
should be reserved exclusively to cases in which the plaintiff has failed to prove harm.
Second, injunctions are not only clear property rights definers, they clearly delineate
rights that already exist. Common law has traditionally recognized that in a nuisancetype setting the property right inheres in the injured plaintiff. See supra Part II. Such
recognition likely flows from a natural sense that polluters may not pollute as of right,
but rather must pay for costs imposed by pollution. Therefore, granting injunctions, as
opposed to taking no action, comports with the rule of law as developed by the common
law.

272. 2 W.L.R. 53, 75 (H.L. 1994); see supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
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tion becomes whether any cases exist wherein it would be more
appropriate to award damages for contemplated harm than to award
injunctive relief. In the setting of contemplated harm, the presumption
should be that injunctions are the only appropriate remedy. 2 73 At least
three values support this presumption. First, issuing injunctions for contemplated harm protects not only the property rights of the plaintiff, but
also protects the plaintiffs liberty interests by securing her fight to choose
for herself the price at which she is willing to dispense with her property.
Second, injunctions serve to internalize the true subjective external costs
that the polluter imposes upon the plaintiff. Under Coasian analysis, if the
defendant's polluting activities are more valuable than the plaintiff's use or
possession combined with transactions costs, a voluntary transfer of the
property right will occur under terms willingly and subjectively set by the
disputing parties despite the injunction.2 74 An award of damages serves to
internalize only objectively determined external costs. Thus injunctive
relief not only protects the plaintiffs right to determine freely and subjectively the value of her own property, it also facilitates market trading based
upon more accurate valuations of property rights than does an award of
damages. Third, a credible threat of injunction encourages bargaining
between the polluter and the owners of property harmed by the pollution
before the polluter begins its activities.
Each of the reasons supporting the use of injunctive relief rather than
damages remedies in pollution cases is founded upon the notion that property rights are inherently connected with liberty. This point is critical
because purely objective value analysis could lead one to conclude that
damages are the preferred legal remedy in nuisance and trespass cases.
The argument is often made that damages serve to internalize external
costs, thus meeting the demands of efficiency. 2 75 A classic scenario illus-

trating this process involves an industrial polluter and a residential plaintiff harmed by the pollution. The polluter's activities impose costs upon
the residential plaintiff that are not taken into account when the polluter
decided its production levels. Using this inaccurate cost figure, the polluting industry produces more goods than society is prepared to purchase,
leaving the plaintiff to bear the pollution costs. 2 76 Damages awards, it is

argued, force the polluting firm to take its pollution costs into account
when selecting its production levels. In this manner, damages force inter273. Calabresi & Melamed raise some compelling objections to making such a presumption irrebuttable. See infra notes 280-83 and accompanying text.
274. Coase's contention that an exchange will occur once property rights are well
defined (as happens with an injunction) rests upon the assumption that such an
exchange could legally occur. Coase never addressed the question of whether a contract
for the sale of an injunction right would be legally valid. No legal obstacles preventing
such a transaction appear to exist. A private injunction represents a court's empowering
a plaintiff to enforce her right to be let alone in the enjoyment of her land. It is up to the
plaintiff to enforce the injunction. If the plaintiff desires to exchange her private right to
an injunction for defendant's consideration, it would appear that she is entitled to do so.
275. See, e.g., BARNS & STOTr, supra note 260, at 22-25; Orchard View Farms, Inc. v.
Martin Marietta Aluminum, 500 F. Supp. 984, 988-89 (D. Or. 1980).
276. Id.
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nalization of external costs. 2 77
But a damages-only analysis ignores the value of freedom. Damage
awards represent a court's objective valuation of the property right vesting
in the plaintiff. No one, however, is better able to determine the value of
the plaintiffs property right to the plaintiff than the plaintiff herself. Denying the plaintiff the opportunity to sit at the bargaining table and choose
for herself whether to accept or reject the price a firm is willing to pay to
possess a portion of her rights is an encroachment upon her liberty. Issuing damages in lieu of injunctions creates a power within firms equivalent
2 78
to private eminent domain.
Injunctions, on the other hand, serve both the values of efficiency and
freedom. 279 If a firm is willing to pay the plaintiffs subjectively determined price, external costs have become internalized in precisely the same
manner as they would be with a damages award, except that the value of
the property right is determined subjectively by the person in whom the
property right is vested; not objectively by the court. If the firm is not
willing to pay the plaintiffs price for the right to pollute her property, then
it (and therefore, society) does not value the right more than the plaintiff
and should not be allowed to acquire it through judicial intervention. In
either case, the value of efficiency is served because the property right vests
in the party that values it the most. In addition, both the plaintiff and the
defendant retain their freedom to enter into a voluntary exchange of the
property right when their individual valuations so determine.
In arguing that transaction costs may be so high as to make damages a
more appropriate remedy against contemplated harm, Calabresi and
Melamed cite "hold-out" and related problems. 2 80 Hold-out "problems"
can exist in any bargaining situation. Essentially, such problems result
from the fact that human beings are not mind-readers and it is impossible
to determine whether a person who insists that she values a property right
to a certain degree actually values it to the level she insists. The bargaining
situation between the polluter and an injunction-holding plaintiff or group
of plaintiffs is not signfficantly different than the bargaining situation that
exists on a used-car lot. No one but the polluter knows what value the
polluter places upon a right to pollute. No one but the property owner
knows what value she places upon her right to be free from such pollution.
The hold-out problem is illustrated in the following example. Suppose
a polluter successfully bargains for the sale of property rights from nine of
ten injunction-holders and the tenth "holds-out" for a higher price than the
value he actually places upon the right. In this situation, if the tenth
277. Id.
278. Cf. Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and
Finesas Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681, 740-41 (1979) (discussing the contention that a damages remedy in a nuisance setting creates a private right of eminent

domain in the defendant, thus infringing on plaintiff's liberty).

279. Cf. A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of
Injunctive and DamageRemedies, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1075 (1980) (comparing the efficiency

of damages versus injunctive remedies).
280. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 264, at 1106-07.
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injunction-holder insists upon holding out for a price far above that at
which he truly values his right, and the firm pays it, he receives no greater
windfall in quality than that received by a used-car salesman who collects
his asking price for an automobile (which undoubtedly was greater than its
true value to him). The firm's payment of the hold-out price demonstrates
that it values the right to pollute at least as much as the hold-out price.
Therefore, the property rights become vested in the party that values them
most, even though a distributional problem exists between the ten injunction holders. 28 1 If the firm refuses to pay the hold-out price, a rational
hold-out injunction-holder would reduce his price if he wants to receive
any windfall at all. If the hold-out injunction-holder comes down in his
price to the level at which he actually values his property right and the firm
refuses to pay it, then the property right is vested in the party who values it
the most, the injunction-holder. Therefore, the hold-out problem is not
really a problem at all, but merely a manifestation of common bargaining
processes.
A more perplexing transaction costs problem arises in a situation in
which it is impossible to get all the potential injunction-holders to the bargaining table, either because they are too numerous or because of strategic
behavior on their parts. 2 82 However, this argument merely reflects high
transactions costs, which cannot justify infringement upon the plaintiff's
right to freely determine the value of her property interest when she has
proven that the defendant's activities have encroached her possession. It is
only when the value of efficiency is not counter-balanced by the value of
liberty that arguments justifying a damages award in lieu of an injunction
become compelling.
Returning again to Calabresi's and Melamed's article, they refer to
accidental personal injury claims as being within the class of cases in
which transactions costs are so high that damages are the appropriate remedy. 28 3 It is true that damages awards are the appropriate remedy for per-

sonal injury cases, but such cases are generally classic examples of past
injury. Calabresi and Melamed note that it would be difficult to give to
potential victims a negotiable property right not to be injured by accidents
in the future, 2 84 but such an example is fundamentally different than a
pollution case involving a manifest pattern of injurious activity and intentional conduct. If a personal injury plaintiff were able to demonstrate a
long-standing pattern of being beat-up by a street bully, then a clear case
for past damages and an injunction against future abusive activities from
the bully would be maintainable.
In summary, Calabresi's and Melamed's construct of entitlements protected by property and liability rules provides a good starting point for
281. This distributional problem is a separate issue, distinct from the value question.

Even though one of the plaintiffs may receive a windfall in a hold-out situation, the
property right still vests in the party that values it the most.
282. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 264, at 1106-07.

283. Id. at 1108-09.
284. Id. at 1108.
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analyzing the issue of damages versus injunction. The true test, however,
for determining whether it is appropriate to award damages, as opposed to
injunctive relief, rests upon the simple difference between past harm, for
which compensatory damages are due, and the prevention of future harm,
against which an injunction should issue. Focusing upon this distinction
portrays the fundamentally flawed nature of a damages remedy for contemplated harm, namely, that it fails to protect plaintiffs' liberty interests.
C. Fault and Duty
One of the difficulties with the term "strict liability" in the property invasion context is that to many people, the notion of liability is followed
closely by visions of damages awards. 285 But where does liability, and particularly strict liability, fit in the context of injunctive relief against pollution? The distinction between past and future is also useful in answering
this question.
Under negligence principles, the duty a defendant owes to a plaintiff is
that of using objectively reasonable or ordinary care in conducting his
activities. 28 6 Strict liability makes no such inquiry into whether defendants should be faulted for not exercising the level of care they were dutybound to exercise. In the case of past harm-a damages setting-strict liability renders defendants liable for the harm they caused regardless of
fault. In the case of contemplated future harm-an injunction setting-the
strict liability concept has its application in keeping consideration of the
reasonableness of a polluter's conduct or balancing of the interests out of a
property invasion equation.
The distinction between the past and the future forms the dividing line
between the two broad categories of cases one usually finds in the pollution context. The first type of case is associated with the past; a discrete
polluting event. In this class of case, the defendant causes pollution, either
accidentally or intentionally, in a one-time event. There is no pattern of
polluting conduct and therefore no evidence of continuing activity against
which an injunction should issue. Thus the remedy is damages, and the
question to be answered is to what standard of fault the defendant ought to
be held. The second class of case is associated with the future; an ongoing
property invasion. In the case of continuing property invasion, courts have
typically labelled the defendant's activity as intentional. 28 7 Because an
injunction action seeks relief against future harm, a defendant is necessarily aware of the injury she is causing and therefore continuing her activities
must be perceived as intentional conduct. 28 8

285. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 264.
286. See, e.g., Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
287. See DoNAHuE, supra note 45, at 875.
288. Lord Goff of Chieveley made this point in Cambridge Water Co., 2 W.L.th 53, 75
(H.L. 1994) ("where an injunction is claimed, its purpose is to restrain further action by
the defendant which may interfere with the plaintiff's enjoyment of his land, and ex
hypothesi the defendant must be aware .... ").
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A conclusion that a no fault standard should apply in an injunction
setting follows from the recognition that a pattern of continuing property
invasions provides dispositive evidence of intentional behavior. Under
standard intentional tort principles, an allegation of intentionally caused
injury disposes of any need to inquire into the reasonableness of the harm
causing activity. This principle follows from the recognition that in intentional tort actions judicial inquiry does not focus on the risk-creating
nature or reasonableness of the defendant's conduct. Rather, judicial
inquiry focuses upon whether the defendant desired or was "substantially
certain" that harm-causing consequences would follow from her pollution
activities. 28 9 Once intent is proven, only causation remains to be demonstrated in order to make out a prima facie case for recovery. Plaintiffs suffering from intentional invasions of their property interests should be
treated no differently than plaintiffs suffering from intentional infliction of
personal injury. Therefore, in an injunction setting, where the defendant's
conduct is intentional, inquiries into fault are inappropriate, as are inquiries into the utility of the defendant's harm causing activities. 290 This is
equally true when damages are requested for harm to property suffered
from an ongoing invasion.
The context in which strict liability requires greater justification is
that of past, discrete property invasion-a damages setting. It is in the case
of discrete incidents of pollution that a defendant seems, at first glance, to
be justified in claiming that the harm she caused was merely accidental
and that she should only be held to a standard of reasonable care. However, two considerations support the imposition of strict liability in such
cases. 2 9 1 -The first consideration, based in fairness, provides that a negli289. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 8A (1977) ("The word 'intent' is used
throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote that the actor desires to cause
consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it."); id. § 282 (defining negligence as "conduct which falls below the
standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of
harm"). See also Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1095 (Wash. 1955) (case remanded
for determination whether five year old boy knew with "substantial certainty that the
plaintiff intended to sit down where the chair had been before he moved it"); Vosburg v.
Putney, 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891) (holding boy liable for kicking a classmate even lacking intent to do harm); MARc A. FR&maj & ROBERT L. RAni, TORT LAw AND ALTERNATIVS

759-64 (1987).

290. See DoNAHuE, supra note 45, at 875. As noted by FRam~Na & RAB N, supra note
289, at 762, it is odd that the prima facie case for intentional nuisance under the provisions of the second Restatement, see supra Part III.B.,
requires an inquiry into the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct. An apparent discrepancy exists between such a

special standard for nuisance and regular doctrines of intentional tort that do not
inquire into reasonableness. The second Restatement of Torts and most jurisdictions
accept that ongoing invasions provide dispositive proof of intent (see DoNmuE, supra
note 45, at 875), but nevertheless require the plaintiff who claims nuisance to prove an

element not part of the traditional prima facie case for intentional tort. Franklin's and
Rabin's observation forces one to ask why, once the plaintiff has proven intent, it would
ever be necessary for a plaintiff to prove that the defendant's conduct was unreasonable
as well. Perhaps a good answer is that a reasonableness standard, under the Restatement's structure, provides a loophole that opens the door to explicit utility balancing.

291. These justifications also apply in the context of ongoing pollution.
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gence standard is only appropriate in cases where risks of accidental harm
are reciprocated between the plaintiff and the defendant. 29 2 The second
and more compelling consideration is grounded in an efficiency
293
analysis.
With respect to the reciprocity consideration, Professor George
Fletcher, after conducting a study of tort cases, in which varying standards
of liability were imposed, concluded that:
The general principle expressed in all of these situations governed.by diverse
doctrinal standards is that a victim has a right to recover for injuries caused
by a risk greater in degree and different in order from those created by the
victim and imposed 29on4 the defendant-in short, for injuries resulting from
nonreciprocal risks.
Under Fletcher's analysis, strict liability should apply to situations where a
defendant's conduct imposed a risk "greater in degree and different in
order" from those imposed upon the defendant by the plaintiff.
A typical example of a situation wherein risks are reciprocal involves
Arthur and Lancelot, pedestrians on a crowded sidewalk in a down-town
business district during lunch time. While walking along the busy sidewalk, Arthur momentarily gazes over at a newsstand to catch a glimpse of
the cover story on his favorite magazine. Not seeing Lancelot moving
directly toward him, Arthur collides with Lancelot, who is unable to avoid
the impact. Lancelot falls to the ground and suffers severe injury. The
standard of care demanded in this situation, under reciprocity analysis,
would be that of reasonable care. This conclusion is founded on the recognition that the risk of injury that Arthur's pedestrian activities imposed
upon Lancelot were the same as the risk of injury imposed upon Arthur
from Lancelot's pedestrian activities. Lancelot could just as easily have
caused an accident that would result in Arthur's being injured. All that the
law requires is that Arthur exerts ordinary or reasonable care in conducting
his activities. Whether Arthur's injury-causing behavior was reasonable in
the preceding example would be a question for the jury.
Under a reciprocity analysis, the case for holding industrial polluters
strictly liable for the harm they cause is compelling. A typical industrial
pollution situation pits a residential property owner against a firm that
releases, for example, fluorides into the atmosphere. There is little risk
that the residential property holder will release, even accidentally, chemical pollutants that will cause the firm's property substantial harm. Therefore, the firm should be held strictly liable for any substantial harm caused
by the actualization of the polluting risks and imposed upon the residential
plaintiff.
The more difficult cases under reciprocity analysis arise in situations
between similarly situated plaintiffs, such as two residential plaintiffs, one
292. See generally George P. Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HALv. L.
REv. 537 (1972).

293. Cf. PosNER, supra note 260, at 160-67.
294. Id.
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of whom pollutes the land of the other. But even in this situation the argument is still compelling that a residential polluter imposes nonreciprocal
risks upon his community. Consider the example of Arthur, a residential
owner. Arthur's hobby is painting automobiles and he prefers to store significant amounts of paint in his garage so that he can combine their various hues and shades in order to create a wide range of colors. Eventually,
several paint cans rust and paint runs upon Lancelot's land, killing his
trees, destroying the beauty of his landscaping. Arthur's paint storage created a risk unlike any that Lancelot's residential activities created for
Arthur. Therefore, he should be held strictly liable for any damage that his
storage activity causes to Lancelot's property. Indeed, unless Arthur could
prove that his residential neighborhood contained a majority of home-owners who store large quantities of paint in their garage and that spillage accidents ordinarily occur, Arthur should be held to a standard of strict
liability for the harm his storage activity causes.
Efficiency considerations also support the imposition of strict liability
in a setting wherein damages are requested for past injury caused by pollution. The application of a negligence standard to an average tort case and a
finding that a defendant exercised reasonable care in his conduct, results
in the injured plaintiff being forced to bear the costs of the accident. In two
situations, efficiency considerations support this result. First, the plaintiff
is the least-cost avoider of the accident, i.e. the cost to the firm of taking the
next available accident prevention measure (marginal cost) is greater than
the marginal cost of accident prevention to the plaintiff.2 95 Second, the

defendant's level of activity is not beyond the optimum level in terms of
29 6
social welfare.
The least-cost avoider consideration was introduced in scholarly
efforts to develop an instrumental framework to replace or to supplement
negligence's case by case analysis. 29 7 These efforts to stream-line the civil
liability system sought to develop categories of activities in which one class
of actor was usually the least cost avoider of accidents. Under this
approach, if a defendant's activities fall into a particular category in which
actors similarly situated to the defendant are almost always the least-cost
avoider, the defendant should be held strictly liable for any harm resulting
298
from conducting his activities.
In cases of discrete incidents of pollution, it is almost always the case
that the polluter is the least-cost avoider of accidents. This conclusion fol295. For an introduction to least cost avoider analysis in the pollution context, see

Frank I. Michelman, Pollutionas a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspectiveon Calabresi'sCosts,

80

YALE

LJ. 647, 654-57 (1971).

296. For a discussion of optimal activity levels, see PosNEP, supra note 260, at 160-64.

Oliver Wendell Holmes provides a third reason to let the plaintiff bear the costs of accidental injury, stating that the "general principle of our law is that loss from accident
must lie where it falls .... " OLuvR W NDa.m. HoLMEs, THE COMMON LAw 94 (1881).
297. See generally BAL, ias & SoUr, supra note 260, at 129; Gumo CALABREsi, THE
Cost op AcCIDENTs: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYsis (1970); Michelman, supra note
295.
298. See BAR, .s & STouT, supra note 260, at 129-30.
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lows from the fact that usually the polluter possesses the greatest information about the risks of pollution from his activities. In the discrete
industrial pollution setting, firms, and not local residential owners, are
well-appraised of the pollution risks inherent in their manufacturing
processes. In the case of Arthur, the automobile painter, it is Arthur who
knows best what is in his own garage. Therefore, the polluters in both of
these contexts should be subjected to strict liability because, by deduction,
social welfare increases when lower-cost accident prevention measures are
taken.
The second efficiency consideration concerns itself with ensuring that
optimal levels of particular activities are achieved. 29 9 While negligence
principles ensure that a cost efficient level of care will result in the conduct
of any given activity,30 0 it does not guarantee that an optimal level of activity, in terms of social welfare will be conducted. Judge Posner described
this proposition as follows:
The baseline common law regime of tort liability is negligence. When it is a
workable regime, because the hazards of an activity can be avoided by being
careful (which is to say, nonnegligent), there is no need to switch to strict
liability. Sometimes, however, a particular type of accident cannot be prevented by taking care but can be avoided, or its consequences minimized, by
shifting the activity in which the accident occurs to another locale, where the
risk of harm of an accident will be less, or by reducing the scale of the activity in order to minimize the number of accidents caused by it. By making
the actor strictly liable-by denying him in other words an excuse based
upon his inability to avoid accidents by being more careful-we give him an
incentive, missing in a negligence regime, to experiment with methods of
preventing accidents that involve not greater exertions of care, assumed to be
futile, but instead relocating, changing, or reducing (perhaps to the vanish30
ing point) the activity giving rise to the accident. '
Holding polluters strictly liable for the harm their polluting activities cause
would thus provide them with an incentive not only to develop more effective pollution control devices, as would exist under a negligence regime,
but also an incentive to relocate, to change the scale of operations, or perhaps even to exit the industry altogether.
Moreover, when accidental pollution costs do not play a role in a
firm's production level decisions, the firm will choose a level of activity
greater than that for which society would be willing to pay had society
considered such pollution costs. Consequently, sub-optimal production
levels will result. An accurate determination of the pollution levels society
is willing to tolerate can occur only if pollution costs are internalized into
299. See Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174,
1177 (7th Cir. 1990); PosNER, supra note 260, § 6.5; Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL SUD. 1 (1980).
300. See McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d. Cir. 1947); BARNES & STOUT, supra note 260, at

92-104.
301. IndianaHarborBelt, 916 F.2d at 1177.
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production level decisions. Holding polluters strictly liable for the harm
caused by their polluting activities will force this internalization.
In sum, both fairness and efficiency considerations compel the conclusion that polluters ought to be held strictly liable for the harm they
cause, even by discrete incidents of pollution. Additional reasons for holding polluters to a strict liability standard are grounded in the high value
associated with the notions of private property and of environmental wellbeing. Placing the burden of pollution costs, even those incurred accidentally, creates a judicial doctrine that compromises environmental quality
by allowing greater pollution levels than social welfare dictates. Thus, the
application of a strict liability standard for pollution serves to protect the
combined values of private property and environmental vitality.
D. The "Coming to the Nuisance" or "Coming to the Encroachment"
Defense
The following example serves to demonstrate briefly the mechanics of the
"coming to the nuisance" or "coming to the encroachment" defense:
Arthur operates a cement factory. Because he desired to avoid both liability
for the pollution he might cause and being handed an injunction, he chose
to locate his activities far away from the city, and hence, far away from
potential plaintiffs. He located his operations on a large tract of rural land
so that all the cement dust created as a by-product of his operations were
deposited upon his own land. Arthur conducted his industrial activities in
this manner over the course of two decades. The value of Arthur's land in
the vicinity of his cement plant dropped significantly as a result of the
constant barrage of cement dust. Arthur later decided that he did not
really need all of the land surrounding his cement plant and so determined
that he would sell a tract on the market at a low price. Being in the market
for some inexpensive farmland and fully informed about the condition of
the land, Galahad bought Arthur's lot at a very good price. Shortly after
buying the land, Galahad became annoyed at the constant settling of
cement dust on his property and brought a common law action against the
invasion of his land.
Galahad presently claims that Arthur should be enjoined from continuing his operations and held strictly liable for the harm caused to
Galahad's land. But Arthur contends that Galahad knew Arthur's cement
plant caused dust to settle upon the tract of land in question but bought it
anyway. Arthur insists that Galahad "came to the nuisance." Furthermore,
Arthur contends that Galahad bought the tract of land in question at a
significantly reduced price because of the cement dust problem. Arthur
argues, in effect, that the costs of Arthur's pollution have become capitalized in the values of his land, including the lot sold to Galahad. If Galahad
receives an injunction and damages, Arthur insists, Galahad will receive an
undeserved windfall.
In this scenario, Arthur would be correct under the proposed model.
When pollution costs have become capitalized in the surrounding land values, the defendant should have the right to raise such a defense to a prop-
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erty invasion action. This affirmative defense would be successful if the
defendant were able to demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that,
all things being equal, granting an injunction would cause a significant and
unfair increase in the value of the plaintiffs property. A "coming to the
encroachment" defense guards against plaintiffs' being able to gain undeserved windfalls by bringing property invasion suits when the costs of pollution have become capitalized in tracts of land bought at reduced prices.
E. Substantial Harm
The Martin model for determining substantial harm needs little additional
explanation, but is worth highlighting. 30 2 Under Martin, the vantage point
of the plaintiff determines the standard for substantial harm. 30 3 As a
result, the especially sensitive plaintiff, one putting her land to a special
use, will have adequate protection for such use. For example, a plaintiff
may dedicate her land to the raising of buffalomps for their milk production. Buffalomp milk production, however, may be particularly sensitive to
levels of fluoride gasses in the ambient air. Under Martin, the standard of
harm in such a case should be measured from the vantage point of a landuse dedicated to buffalomp milk production, and the plaintiff would have
the burden of showing substantial harm to her land use in that regard.
The Martin standard for determining substantial harm is ideal in the
environmental law context for at least two reasons. First, it recognizes that
not all land uses are equally sensitive to the effects of pollution. Therefore,
plaintiffs who may dedicate their land to certain environmentally sensitive
uses are not left without a remedy when their property rights are invaded.
Second, the Martin harm standard focuses the court's attention on determining whether the plaintiff has in fact suffered substantial injury. Under
a Martin standard, the common law would likely develop various contextual harm standards in accordance with different categories of land-use
activities. Such developments would require hard scientific research and
testable data. In short, scientifically founded information would be of
30 4
prime significance under Martin's standard for determining harm.
F. Reciprocal Encroachment
Justice Bramwell's concept of reciprocal nuisances from his opinion in
Bamford v. Turnley 30 5 also needs little additional explanation. This principle provides an exception to the general rule of strict liability for property
encroachments arising from land uses that are common or ordinary. The
reciprocal encroachment principle should be used with caution and with
particular care in order to avoid expanding it beyond its limited scope. The
pragmatic policy behind allowing for reciprocal encroachments is the discouragement of petty law suits. In keeping with Bramwell's principle,
302. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
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plaintiffs may recover damages and seek injunctions against harm caused
30 6
by common and ordinary uses upon a showing of wantoness or malice.
It should be noted that this principle should never be employed in the context of industiral pollution of the property of residential plaintiff, as pollutive encroachments are per se exceptional.
G. Summary
If federal environmental statutes were abandoned in favor of the common
law, the following is a summary of the model of law that would be necessary to effectively govern environmental harm. The foundation of the
model comes from Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co. 30 7 The Martin inquiry is
divided into two parts. 30 8 The first part asks whether the plaintiff has a
legally protected property interest. 30 9 The second, asks whether the plaintiffs property right (assuming it exists) was substantially harmed by the
defendant's activities. 3 10 These two inquires are intertwined, so that the
question of whether a defendant has substantially harmed the plaintiffs
property right depends upon the scope of the plaintiffs right. Further the
scope of the plaintiffs right is determined from the vantage point of the
plaintiff.
Ascertaining the appropriate remedy in a property invasion setting
depends, essentially, upon the distinction between past and future. Past
harm to a plaintiffs property rights, discrete or otherwise, receives its remedy in the form of compensatory damages. The ruling presumption in the
context of contemplating future harm from ongoing pollution is that
awards of damages instead of injunctions are inappropriate. Injunctions
are the best remedy against future harm. Even when transactions costs are
prohibitively high, in light of damage being done to a plaintiff's liberty
interests by a court-forced sale of property rights, injunctions remain the
only appropriate remedy in a future setting.
In the pollution setting, inquiry into defendant's fault is inappropriate.
The defendant should be held strictly liable for any past damages caused
by his activities and should not be allowed to plead reasonableness, social
utility, or any other interest balancing arguments as a defense to an injunction. There are good reasons why such defenses were never allowed traditionally. First of all, ongoing pollution is intentional in its nature and,
therefore, inquiries into fault are entirely irrelevant in actions to abate. Second, in cases of discrete incidents of pollution, not only do principles of
fairness and equity favor the suffering plaintiff, but also considerations of
efficiency. The defendant's only defense against an injunction in a case of
ongoing and substantially harmful pollution is that the plaintiff "came to
the invasion." Under this defense, the defendant must prove that the costs
of its pollution became capitalized in land values and that the plaintiff
306. See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
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receiving a legal remedy against the defendant's pollution would create a
windfall of benefits for the plaintiff.
Conclusion
In the twentieth century, American and English societies have seen a dramatic shift from a rule of law founded upon the common law to a legal
regime predominantly statutory in nature. So dominating is the presence
of statutory law that few question the presumption that federal statutes,
and not the common law, should grant the environment its legal voice. 3 1 1
This presumption ought to be tested and challenged.
Common law nuisance has undergone transformations in America
and England that have weakened its effectiveness as a tool for environmental protection. A classic form of nuisance law, however, equipped with
strict liability and the power to enjoin polluting activities would provide a
powerful environmental cause of action. This Note advocates a return to
traditional common law principles founded upon successful judicial efforts
to address environmental concerns, efforts made a decade before the significant federal environmental legislation of the 1970s was introduced. But it
is not only a return to traditional common law that is advocated, rather a
contemporary version of it, fit to tackle the environmental problems of the
modem era.
An underlying purpose of this Note has been to promote reflection
and discussion upon a legal system that seems to have been either
neglected or given short shrift in the international environmental debates
of our time. Determining the scope of the common law within an international system of environmental protection is the topic of additional discussion. This Note argues that the common law ought to play a greater role in
environmental protection. A common law solution to the problem of pollution should not be rejected in favor of statutory or regulatory solutions
without closer examination of models such as that proposed in this Note.
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